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ABSTRACT 
This Article outlines looming budgetary and accounting issues with federal student 
loans and proposes securitization as an innovative mechanism to reform federal 
accounting, reduce federal balance sheet risk, and provide a new education quality 
indicator. The current federal loan program is unsustainable because it overestimates 
the repayment rates and underestimates the cost of certain loan programs. 
Securitization will reduce that federal risk. Additionally, by forcing academic 
institutions to bear some of the risk, securitization will create a neutral pricing 
mechanism outside the direct control of federal regulators to show whether academic 
institutions provide a quality education. While complicated, this proposal provides 
an innovative, back-end-loaded-solution to introduce risk-based pricing into student 
loan programs without placing the risks fully on uninformed students. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
Robert Proudfoot is a 2013 graduate of University of Kentucky College of Law. 
Before attending law school, he spent a year at the Department of Education Office 
of Inspector General as a compliance inspector. He would like to thank University of 
Kentucky’s Dean Douglas Michael for allowing him to write this paper as an 
independent study, Professor Scott Bauries and Professor Christopher Frost for their 
guidance, and the Law Library’s excellent research staff (Tina Brooks, Ryan 
Valentin, and Beau Steenken). He also would like to thank his wife, Christy Te, for 
listening to him talk about student loan policy so abstractly when it impacted their 
lives so directly. 
  
2014 Securitization of Student Loans 7 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 8 
II.  HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING ..................................... 11 
A.  Post World War II Period ................................................................ 12 
B.  Congress Expands Student Loan Funding ....................................... 14 
C.  Policy Issues Concerning Government Backed Loans .................... 19 
D.  Current Programs ............................................................................. 24 
III.  GOVERNMENT RISKS ............................................................................ 27 
A.  Federal Accounting and Budget Risks ............................................. 29 
B.  Risks Stemming From a Lack of Quality Education Control .......... 37 
IV.  HISTORY OF STUDENT LOAN SECURITIZATION .................................... 44 
A.  Securitization Principles .................................................................. 46 
B.  Government Sponsored Enterprises & Securitization ..................... 47 
C.  Dodd-Frank “Skin in the Game” Risk Retention Provisions ........... 49 
D.  Securitization of Student Loans ....................................................... 51 
E.  Current Market for Securitized Student Loans ................................ 52 
V.  PROPOSALS TO REDUCE GOVERNMENT RISK ....................................... 53 
A.  Proposals that Can Be Implemented Immediately ........................... 54 
B.  Proposals that Require Further Study .............................................. 60 
VI.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 66 
 
  
8 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 6 
I. INTRODUCTION 
hat is the purpose of a postsecondary education? Everyone has a 
different answer. Academics claim that postsecondary 
education enhances a student’s understanding of his or her world. 
Politicians believe that postsecondary education creates a better and 
more informed society and electorate. Employers use education as a 
barrier to entry to sort through potential employees and to verify an 
applicant’s skill sets. Students may not even know why they are in 
school, only that it is supposed to be the next step on the ladder to a 
successful life. But, at the end of the day, higher education is an 
investment of resources—time, money, and opportunity cost.1 
The question then becomes: who can best determine if an 
educational investment is worth the time, the expense, and the effort? 
Naturally, the student making the educational choice comes to mind as 
the best bearer of risk because he or she knows his or her own 
capabilities, desires, and limitations.2 The optimal allocation of risk for 
an investment in higher education, however, is complicated because 
this type of investment presents a classic example of informational 
asymmetry.3 
Informational asymmetry is an economic term that describes an 
inefficient market caused by one party in a transaction having more 
information than the other, which makes it impossible to have rational, 
optimal pricing for a product.4 Students, for example, only make an 
educational investment once or possibly twice in their lifetime. 
Academic institutions, on the other hand, make decisions thousands of 
times per semester on whom to enroll, what to teach, and how to 
educate students effectively. State and federal regulators also have had 
decades of experience reviewing institutional quality and abuses. This 
                                                 
1 See Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 527, 
531–32 (2013). 
2 See id. at 590 (asserting that students would benefit from a risk-based system of 
student loan pricing as it would force students to internalize the economic risks 
when making decisions regarding their education). 
3 See Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham, Options for Student Borrowers: 
A Derivatives-Based Proposal to Protect Students and Control Debt-Fueled 
Inflation in the Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 
110–11 (2010). 
4 Id. (explaining the economic theory of informational asymmetry by describing 
the inherent differences between the law students as the consumers of a legal 
education and the law schools and lenders as the sellers of a legal education). 
W
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imbalance of information creates an inefficient market where the 
average student makes an uninformed decision about his or her 
educational investment. While there have been recent efforts to 
promote disclosure to level the information-divide between 
participants, students will probably never have the same information as 
institutions. 
This informational asymmetry creates a bizarre relationship where 
an uninformed student makes an education choice that is supported by 
federal student loans. As a result the federal government—not the 
academic institution—bears the risk of whether the student will have a 
favorable outcome from his or her education investment.5 Even though 
the federal government has approximately $1 trillion in student loan 
debt, its capacity to regulate the quality of academic institutions is 
limited. Our current student loan system exposes the federal 
government to large risks but fails to provide quality education 
indicators to prospective or current students. Any proposal to reform 
federal student loan programs should incentivize the fair valuing of 
loans on the federal balance sheet, reduce government risk, and 
provide a quality education indicator to institutions to adjust their 
policies to reduce the risk of bad outcomes from students with 
asymmetrical information. Additionally, student loans—not tuition 
costs—are the proper focus of reform because the federal government 
bears the risk when a student pays his or her tuition with loans. 
Securitization is underutilized in federal student loan programs and 
could be used to reduce risk and to create a market price for assets. 
Securitization is a financial term that refers to the pooling of debt 
instruments for sale to third-party investors to offset risks associated 
with owning or lending against an asset.6 Securitizing student loans 
                                                 
5 This allocation of risk analytically is similar to the inefficient mortgage market 
that led to the sub-prime crisis of 2008: homeowners bought houses assuming 
successful outcomes, the federal government indirectly was burdened with 
homeowners’ mortgage risks through Government Sponsored Enterprises—
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac—and the banks that were responsible for originating 
the loans carried little risk. See April A. Wimberg, Comparing the Education 
Bubble to the Housing Bubble: Will Universities be Too Big to Fail?, 51 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177, 190–91 (2012). 
6 See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, 
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1373–75 (1991); see 
also Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229, 
1239–44 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What 
Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2012). 
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can force accurate accounting for third-party sales, reduce federal debt, 
and provide an additional feedback mechanism for academic 
institutions and for accreditors to improve education outcomes for 
uninformed students. Securitization is only possible if the loans are 
valued accurately by the Department of Education (Department) 
through fair accounting principles to minimize the losses when the 
loans are sold. Once the loans are valued accurately, securitization 
provides a method to deleverage government risk through sales to 
private investors—there is already current, viable market demand. 
Finally, if academic institutions are required to share the losses, or 
gains, from securitization—much like originators of asset-backed 
securities have risk retention requirements in Dodd-Frank—then 
institutions will receive feedback from a third-party market-pricing 
mechanism as to whether their educational product is a quality 
investment. There have been other efforts to reform student loans in 
the past, such as bankruptcy reform,7 but none have focused on reform 
through the federal budget—which historically has been the primary 
catalyst for policy changes. 
This Article analyzes the risks created by federal student loan 
programs and proposes changes for reducing or eliminating these risks. 
Part II provides a brief history of higher education financing, including 
an overview of federal student loan policies as they relate to the 
federal budget. Using this budgetary perspective, Part III identifies two 
types of government risks that have not been addressed in other 
student loan reform proposals: federal accounting and budget risks, 
and the risks stemming from the lack of quality education control. Part 
IV considers student loan repayment rates as a simplified quality 
education indicator and provides a brief history of student loan 
securitization. Finally, Part V proposes changes for reducing or 
eliminating the risks created by the current federal student loan 
programs. Specifically, this Article proposes reforming existing 
legislation to more accurately show the riskiness of student loan debt, 
securitizing federal student loan assets to reduce government risk, and 
creating market-based risk sharing to offset some or all losses from 
                                                 
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) (prohibits discharges of student loans in 
bankruptcy); Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism: The Case for Risk-
Based Pricing and Dischargeability, 126 HARV. L. REV. 587, 603 (2012) 
[hereinafter Harvard Note] (arguing that repealing § 523(a)(8) would decrease 
indebtedness and defaults by permitting the most financially distressed 
borrowers to discharge their student loan debt in bankruptcy). 
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securitization and to close the feedback loop between students, 
accreditors, institutions, and regulators. 
II. HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING 
Prior to the advent of “federal aid,” extending credit to an 
unproven student was a risky proposition. Student loans were 
investments in a person’s future-earnings capability or, at the very 
least, in his or her ability to repay the loan with no collateral to reduce 
the risk of default.8 Universities rarely extended credit to students. 
Milton Friedman, in his 1955 essay The Role of Government in 
Education, aptly explained this risk and the corresponding 
underinvestment in education: 
This underinvestment in human capital presumably reflects an 
imperfection in the capital market: investment in human beings 
cannot be financed on the same terms or with the same ease as 
investment in physical capital. It is easy to see why there would be 
such a difference. If a fixed money loan is made to finance 
investment in physical capital, the lender can get some security for 
his loan in the form of a mortgage or residual claim to the physical 
asset itself, and he can count on realizing at least part of his 
investment in case of necessity by selling the physical asset. If he 
makes a comparable loan to increase the earning power of a human 
being, he clearly cannot get any comparable security; in a non-
slave state, the individual embodying the investment cannot be 
bought and sold.9 
This investment uncertainty makes private entities reluctant to 
provide student loans. There are grim, actuarial calculations to 
consider: the person could fail to complete his or her studies, become 
severely disabled, or die.10 
Further, a quality education does not translate necessarily into a 
successful outcome relative to earnings or employment. A student may 
also choose a course of study that makes it difficult to obtain 
employment—studying law, the arts, or architecture. Also, even if a 
student has an education, he or she may not have the skill sets 
necessary to secure employment in an ever-changing business 
environment. 
                                                 
8 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 85, 102 (Univ. of Chicago Press 40th ed. 2009) (1962). 
9 Id. at 102. 
10 Id. 
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For over eight centuries, academic institutions have struggled to 
find ways to lend money to students, either through credit 
enhancements or government assistance. In 1240, Oxford University 
developed the concept of a loan chest, which became widely used in 
Europe to assist financially-needy students.11 A student who did not 
have enough money to pay for school would deposit an item of 
personal property in the loan chest as security in exchange for tuition 
for the semester.12 If the student did not pay, then the academic 
institution would sell the student’s collateral to recover its loss.13 
In the United States, instead of requiring credit enhancements 
similar to the collateral required for loan chests, the federal 
government more recently has decided to bear the risk of student 
loans.14 By bearing the risk of student loans, the government expands 
access to higher education and, in theory, receives a greater number of 
highly trained, work-ready citizens in return.15 
All major shifts in student loan policies have been driven primarily 
by their favorable impact to the federal budget. This is true for each of 
the following: the switch from direct to guaranteed loans in 1965, the 
use of Sallie Mae as a securitizer in 1972, changes to the accounting of 
federally-owned loans in 1990, and the switch from guaranteed loans 
back to direct loans in 2010. By understanding this historical context, 
it becomes possible to evaluate the success of future student loan 
reform proposals. Any new reform to student loans must directly 
address and resolve budgetary issues to be effective. 
A. Post World War II Period 
The G.I. Bill after World War II formed the conceptual basis of 
federal aid for postsecondary education. Titled the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, the program paid tuition expenses and 
                                                 
11 See Middle Ages, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD: FINANCE DIVISION, http://www
.admin.ox.ac.uk/finance/information/history/middleages/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2013) (discussing the establishment of loans chests in 1240). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 See, e.g., Simkovic, supra note 1, at 550 (“[T]he U.S. [has] shifted toward a 
centralized, taxpayer-funded, and government-coordinated model of university-
based scientific and technical research, coupled with increased education 
subsidies.”). 
15 Id. at 532–47 (citing statistical data supporting the theory that education leads to 
better employment outcomes). 
2014 Securitization of Student Loans 13 
living allowances to qualifying veterans when they returned home 
after the war.16 The cost of this program was a direct expense to the 
federal budget as a grant program. The Department of Veteran Affairs 
(VA) approved the eligibility of academic institutions for the program 
based on the recommendations of state agencies.17 As would become a 
recurring theme in federal funding of higher education, the VA and 
other federal entities did not evaluate institutions based on the quality 
of education; instead, federal entities relied on the opinions of state 
regulators and accreditors. 
This delegation of regulatory authority has been referred to 
informally as the “triad” of actors—federal agencies, state agencies, 
and accreditors—in educational quality assurance.18 This delegation 
was formalized in 20 U.S.C. § 1011c, creating the National Advisory 
Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) to 
determine standards for accreditation, state licensing, and institutional 
eligibility.19 In addition to determining accreditation standards by a 
committee, Congress passed 20 U.S.C. § 1232a in 1970 to limit the 
federal government’s power in regulating education.20 In part, § 1232a 
states, “No provision of any applicable program shall be construed to 
authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United 
States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the 
                                                 
16 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284, 287–
89 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); History of the GI 
Bill, NAVY PERSONNEL COMMAND, http://www.public.navy.mil/BUPERS-
NPC/CAREER/EDUCATION/GIBILL/Pages/GIBillHistory.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2013) (discussing the fact that although earlier veteran assistance 
programs existed, there was not a large education assistance component until 
World War II). 
17 See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 § 400, 58 Stat. at 289. 
18 Report to the U.S. Secretary of Education—Accreditation Policy 
Recommendations, NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST. QUALITY AND 
INTEGRITY—U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2012-spring/teleconference-2012/naciqi-final-
report.pdf [hereinafter Higher Education Accreditation]. 
19 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(a), (c) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-177, at 19 (2011) 
(discussing the “triad” regulatory structure in higher education and 
Congressional delegation of the regulation of the quality of education to 
accreditors). 
20 See Robert S. Eitel & Kent D. Talbert, The Road to a National Curriculum: The 
Legal Aspects of the Common Core Standards, Race to the Top, and Conditional 
Waivers, 13 ENGAGE 13, 13 (2012), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120216
_EitelTalbertEngage13.1.pdf (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2012)). 
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curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any 
educational institution . . . .”21 This current statute was based on 
similar language created at the inception of federal aid in higher 
education in 1958.22 
In essence, the Department cannot regulate the quality of education 
because Congress has delegated that power to third-party accreditors 
and state regulators.23 This forms the framework for federal oversight 
and explains why the Department has limited power to restrict 
institutional access to financial aid funds based on the quality of 
education. 
B. Congress Expands Student Loan Funding 
Congress further developed this concept of federal aid for 
postsecondary education through the National Defense Education Act 
of 1958 (NDEA).24 This was the precursor to the Perkins Loan 
Program.25 Unlike the G.I. Bill, the NDEA provided assistance 
regardless of a student’s military or veteran status.26 It provided low 
interest loans to students who studied math and science27 to improve 
the United States’ competitiveness in the space race.28 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 102, 72 
Stat. 1580, 1582 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232a). 
23 H.R. REP. NO. 112-177, at 19 (“Because of concern about federal interference in 
school operations, curriculum, and instruction, the Department of 
Education . . . has relied on accrediting agencies and States to determine and 
enforce standards of program quality.”). 
24 See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
25 See id. (forming the loan program for qualifying students studying science and 
engineering, later relabeled the Perkins Loan Program); Higher Education 
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 461, 106 Stat. 448, 576 (codified 
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa (2012)). 
26 Congress recognized that promoting science would benefit national defense. See 
National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 101, 72 Stat. at 1581. 
27 See National Defense Education Act of 1958 §§ 204, 205, 72 Stat. at 1584–86. 
28 See generally Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in 
Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 504 (2000) (“The first federal 
student loan program was enacted as a national defense measure.”). 
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The loan portion of the NDEA was accounted in the federal budget 
as a direct expense in the year the funds were disbursed.29 For 
example, if the loan was $100 at 3% interest, the government booked a 
$100 cost on its budget the year the funds were disbursed and then 
booked revenues as they were repaid. This method of cash basis 
accounting, which was standard for the federal government at the time, 
made it prohibitively expensive to provide student loans to students 
because it had the same budgetary treatment as a grant program.30 
The problem with the NDEA program was that it required 
Congress to appropriate large initial funds in the budget, on an 
ongoing basis, to pay for the disbursement of loans—even when 
officials were reasonably sure that the programs would eventually cost 
much less as a result of repayments. For example, if 10 students each 
have a $100 loan—for a total of $1000 in loans— then the cost to the 
government would be $1000 during the first year. However, assuming 
an interest rate of 3% and no defaults, the actual return after 10 years 
would be around $1350. Thus, the $1000 budgetary cost in the first 
year would become a surplus of $350 at the end of the tenth year. 
Public policy officials realized that a different funding approach was 
needed to expand access and reduce costs. 
Congress and the Johnson administration found their budgetary 
work-around in the Higher Education Act of 1965. This act served as 
the turning point where the federal government opened financial aid to 
all students regardless of their area of study or previous military 
service.31 The Act sought to expand access to higher education through 
programs of grants and loans,32 such as the Guaranteed Student Loan 
Program (GSLP). This provided an innovative compromise as a gap-
filler for any student’s financial need beyond grants while also 
                                                 
29 Federal Student Loan Programs History, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION, 
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-
history (last visited May 15, 2013). 
30 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO HRD-91-144BR, STUDENT LOANS: 
DIRECT LOANS COULD SAVE MONEY AND SIMPLIFY PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION 
2 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 GAO REPORT]. 
31 See Higher Education Act of 1965 Pub L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070 –1099e 
(2012). 
32 See Higher Education Act of 1965 Pub L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219; id. at §401 
(creating the Educational Opportunity Grant Program); id. at §421 (creating the 
Guaranteed Student Loan Program). 
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minimizing its financial impact to the budget. The GSLP was renamed 
the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program when the Higher 
Education Act was reauthorized in 1992.33 
The GSLP provided federal government guarantees on loans made 
to students by non-government lenders; the government did not 
directly loan the funds.34 When this program was created, any loan 
directly owned by the government was required to be placed on the 
balance sheet as an expense until repaid.35 A 1991 Government 
Accountability Office report explains the budgetary rational for 
adopting this approach: 
A direct loan’s cost was equivalent to the outlay for loan principal. 
Subsequent defaults and repayments were accounted for in the year 
they occurred, not when the loan was made. As a result of this 
accounting method, direct loans appeared much more expensive 
than guaranteed loans.36 
Thus, the GSLP was developed to mitigate the program costs in the 
federal budget while also incentivizing private lenders to make loans 
to students.37 
The Educational Opportunity Grant Program, which also was 
considered a direct expense, was created in 1965 to provide grants to 
students with financial need.38 This program was later renamed the 
Federal Pell Grant Program after Senator Claiborne Pell from Rhode 
Island because of his focus on higher education reform during the 
1960s and 1970s.39 At the time it was passed in 1965, the grant 
                                                 
33 See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 411(a), 106 
Stat. 448, 510 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1071(c)). 
34 See Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 97 (noting that under the FFEL 
Program, the federal government provided subsidies to lenders for originating 
federal student loans); see also DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW—
FISCAL 2012 BUDGET REQUEST S-3, S-4 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/s-loansoverview.pdf [hereinafter 
STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW]. 
35 See Federal Student Loan History, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://febp
.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-history 
(last visited May 15, 2013). 
36 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 2. 
37 Id. 
38 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1178, at 15 (1965). 
39 William H. Hohan, Claiborne Pell, Ex-Senator, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 1, 
2009, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/us/politics
/02pell.html. 
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program improved access to education but also was expensive to the 
federal budget at cost of $70 million per year.40 In fact, for fiscal year 
2012, the Office of Federal Student Aid disbursed over $33 billion in 
Pell Grants to students.41 
As discussed in Part I, private lenders generally do not provide 
loans to students because of the uncertainty that results from an 
inability to secure an interest to reduce risk.42 To get lenders to 
participate in the GSLP, the government provided two separate 
subsidies or credit enhancements. First, the government provided 
guarantees against loss of principal in the event of a default.43 Second, 
the government insulated lenders from market risk by guaranteeing 
lenders a set rate of return on interest.44 From a budgetary standpoint, 
the government only had to budget for a fraction of the cost of the 
actual loan, which allowed the government to quickly expand the 
program.45 It is important, however, to point out that this risk exposure 
was not capped and the government was still vulnerable to bad 
outcomes. For instance, if more students than estimated could not 
repay the interest or defaulted on loans, the annual risk-to-cost ratio to 
the federal government would increase as well. 
The GSLP expanded a state-by-state non-profit cottage industry for 
student loans, which already provided loans to students through state 
programs.46 Even with the credit enhancements from the federal 
government through the GSLP, the industry was fragmented, and it 
constantly struggled for more capital to make loans to students.47 To 
                                                 
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1178, at 64. 
41 DEP’T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2012 8 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/reports/annual/2012report/fsa-report.pdf [hereinafter FSA 2012 BUDGET]. 
42 See Friedman, supra note 8, at 102. 
43 Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 97 & n.142 (“[I]f a borrower defaults 
on a FFEL loan, the government pays the lender ninety-seven percent of the 
outstanding principal . . . while the lender assumes default risk for only the 
remaining three percent of the loan principal.” (citation omitted)). 
44 Id. at 97 & n.143. 
45 1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 2. 
46 See Bradley J. B. Toben & Carolyn P. Osolinik, Nonprofit Student Lenders and 
Risk Retention: How the Dodd-Frank Act Threatens Students’ Access to Higher 
Education and the Viability of Nonprofit Student Lenders, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 
158, 178–79 (2012). 
47 MARK WOLFE, Legislative History of Student Loan Marketing Association, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. CRS-1 (May 17, 1982) (“[Graduate Student Loan 
(GSL)] lenders, many of whom had accumulated relatively large portfolios of 
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alleviate this pressure and to accelerate funding, the federal 
government formed Sallie Mae in 1972.48 
When it was created, Sallie Mae was a government sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) similar to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Its purpose 
was to buy existing loans from non-profits—thus returning capital to 
lenders to make more loans—and package the loans into securitized 
investments similar to bonds.49 This pooling mechanism enabled 
investors to invest in diversified risk pools of student loans and 
enabled lenders to capitalize loan assets instead of waiting ten years 
for repayment. Additionally, because of the principal guarantees from 
the GSLP, the loans could be sold and securitized at relative par value 
irrespective of actual loan risk. This securitization process is similar to 
mortgage origination.50 GSEs and securitization are discussed in 
greater detail in Part IV. The combination of federal credit 
enhancements and GSE liquidity stabilized and expanded the market 
for student loans in higher education. 
To further leverage this privatized system of student loans, 
Congress expanded funding for guaranteed loans to almost all students 
when it removed strict income requirements for loans in the Middle 
Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) in 1978.51 MISAA helped 
the federal government increase funding by 39% to $3 billion in 
1979.52 As stated above, this budgetary expense only covered the 
estimated guarantee-cost to the federal government from private loans. 
Using a 2005 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study as a reference 
point, a guaranteed loan of $100 would have a subsidization cost to the 
                                                                                                                   
student loans, became increasing reluctant to commit additional funds for GSLs 
because of their relative lack of liquidity, long repayment schedules, and 
relatively high servicing costs.”). 
48 Id. (citing Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 439(b)(1), 86 
Stat. 235, 265 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)). 
49 See Wolfe, supra note 47, at CRS-1. 
50 See Wimberg, supra note 5, at 190–91 (discussing the similarities between the 
current student loan origination process and the mortgage origination process). 
51 See Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA), Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 
Stat. 2402 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
52 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL STUDENT ASSISTANCE: ISSUE AND OPTIONS 35 
(March 1980), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/111xx
/doc11178/80doc12.pdf. 
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Department’s budget of roughly $15, or a 15% subsidization rate.53 
This freed up more capital in the annual budget to make additional 
student loans because a $100 loan now only cost the federal 
government roughly $15 through subsidized guarantees in the budget. 
Thus, $100 budgeted for student loan costs in the federal budget could 
be leveraged to roughly $666 in loans to students.54 In sum, the 
government favored the GSLP as a way to reduce direct costs in the 
federal budget and expand access to student loans. 
C. Policy Issues Concerning Government Backed Loans  
The new expansion of unsecured student loans also raised policy 
concerns from debt discharges in bankruptcies in the 1970s. Rumors of 
students purposefully taking on high levels of debt and then 
discharging that debt in bankruptcy proceedings pushed Congress to 
act in the late 1970s.55 Congress required students to prove “undue 
hardship” in order to discharge recent loans.56 Most courts interpreted 
undue hardship as a difficult standard to meet.57 While this policy was 
                                                 
53 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SUBSIDY ESTIMATES FOR GUARANTEED AND DIRECT 
LOAN PROGRAMS 11 (2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/ftpdocs/68xx/doc6874/11-16-studentloans.pdf [hereinafter CBO SUBSIDY 
ESTIMATES]. 
54 These estimates using the 2005 subsidization rate of 15% are only to illustrate 
how loan costs impact the federal budget and how the estimated subsidy rate 
reduces the annual budget costs per loan (or increases the amount available to be 
loaned). As stated above, $100 at a 15% subsidization rate; $100 / .15 = $666.66 
loans available for a government cost of $100. See generally, Student Loans 
Overview – Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Proposal, Dep’t of Educ., S-11, 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget14/justifications/s-loans
overview.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Department of Education Budget Proposal]. 
55 Simkovic, supra note 1, at 612–13. 
56 Id. at 613 (citing Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the 
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational 
Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 420–21 (2005)). 
57 See, e.g., Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 
831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court’s 
ruling that the bankruptcy court had discharged the appellant’s student loan in 
error on the grounds that the appellant had failed to establish “additional 
circumstances” beyond an inability to pay and thus was ineligible for a 
discharge based on “undue hardship”); see also Simkovic, supra note 1, at 612–
13 (citing Pardo & Lacey, supra note 56, at 185); Brendan Hennessy, Comment, 
The Partial Discharge of Student Loans: Breaking Apart the All or Nothing 
Interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8), 77 TEMP. L. REV. 71, 78 (2004) (noting 
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meant to prevent bad actors from abusing the student loan system, it 
also functioned as a way to improve the credit-worthiness of student 
loans through improved collections rights.58 Thus, these unsecured 
loans became more secure than credit card debt or personal loans. This 
favorable impact to the credit-worthiness of federal loans helps explain 
why it originally passed and why it has not changed despite numerous 
pushes for reform. 
The Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) of 1990 drastically 
changed the accounting treatment of student loans in the federal 
budget by switching all federally owned loans from cash basis 
accounting to accrual accounting.59 In 1989, a CBO study about credit 
reform for accounting policies explained why guaranteed loans were 
preferred to direct loans because of differences in accounting 
treatments: “The difference in the budgetary treatment between direct 
loans and guaranteed loans creates a bias in favor of guarantees 
because their costs are deferred.”60 The previous cash basis treatment 
was the primary reason Congress switched in 1965 from direct loan 
programs61 through the National Defense Education Act, now the 
Perkins Loan Program,62 to the Guaranteed Loan Program, now the 
FFEL Program.63 The FCRA defines the cost of a direct loan through a 
net-present-value—discounted cash flow—calculation.64 This 
essentially allows an agency to account for the expected return or cost 
at the time of the disbursement, thus reducing the budgetary impact for 
                                                                                                                   
that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted the standards articulated in Brunner 
for determining “undue hardship”). 
58 Simkovic, supra note 1, at 609; see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN REPORT, 70–71 (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans
.pdf. 
59 See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. V, 104 Stat. 
1388-610 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 661a–661f (2012)); see also CBO 
SUBSIDY ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at 10. 
60 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CREDIT REFORM: COMPARABLE BUDGET COSTS FOR 
CASH AND CREDIT xii (1989), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6758/89-cbo-031.pdf. 
61 Federal Student Loan Programs History, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION, 
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-
history (last visited May 15, 2013). 
62 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa–1087ii (2012). 
63 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1087-4. 
64 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A) (2012). 
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that year. This calculation and the ways in which it impacts the budget 
are discussed in Part IV. 
The FCRA’s change to accrual accounting allowed policy officials 
from both political parties to re-evaluate direct loan programs in order 
to simplify the loan process and reduce loan costs to the budget. 
Congress, with support from President George H. W. Bush’s 
administration, created a pilot program for direct loans as result of the 
FCRA accounting treatment change.65 While small in size, it allowed 
the Department to book favorably the expected return on investment at 
the time of the disbursement. In his first year of office, President 
Clinton converted this pilot program into what is now called the Direct 
Loan Program.66 
While it was clear that the Direct Loan Program reduced budgetary 
costs, the program had limited success during the 1990s and early 
2000s. During that time, direct loans initially rose to 35% but 
eventually fell to roughly 25% of all federal student loans.67 The 
program was under-utilized because institutions could choose between 
FFEL and Direct Loan programs and Republican lawmakers favored 
FFEL programs by providing favorable terms for loan guarantee 
payments.68 Additionally, private lenders and financial aid officers of 
universities were accused of being involved in kickback schemes to 
funnel students to private and FFEL loans as opposed to direct loans.69 
In 2007, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA) 
diminished the FFEL program by changing the financial compensation 
                                                 
65 See A History of Direct Loans, FEDERAL STUDENT AID—DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dlfsheets/doc0006_bodyoftext.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 
2013); see also Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 
§ 451, 106 Stat. 448, 569–76; Robert Shireman, Straight Talk on Student Loans, 
CTR. FOR STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUC.—U. CAL. BERKELEY 5 (2004), http://cshe
.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ROP.Shireman.Loans.10.04.pdf (“Congress, 
prompted by a memo leaked from the Bush administration that indicated direct 
loans would be less costly and simpler to administer than guaranteed loans, 
responded by creating a pilot program of direct student loans.”). 
66 See Shireman, supra note 65, at 5. 
67 Id. at 6. 
68 Id. at 6–7. 
69 See Special Report: Student Loan Scandal, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, 
http://education.newamerica.net/special_report_student_loan_scandal (last 
visited May 15, 2013) (providing a comprehensive list of news articles, 
investigative studies and opinion pieces from 2006 to 2008). 
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for private lenders and servicers.70 It reduced the amount of principal 
guaranteed by the government and also reduced the fees and interest 
rate subsidies to lenders.71 The result of this policy was to make FFEL 
loans less profitable to private lenders, which correspondingly reduced 
the market of student loan lenders. The financial crisis demonstrated 
weaknesses in the FFEL program because of its dependence on private 
lenders to provide capital for student loans.72 In the fall of 2008, banks 
and other lenders were having trouble finding enough capital to lend to 
students for the fall semester.73 
To recapitalize the lenders, President George W. Bush and 
Congress enacted the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loan Act 
of 2008 (ECASLA) to buy FFEL loans from private lenders.74 
Congress granted authority to the Department, which utilized complex 
financial structures, such as put-options and asset buying conduits, to 
repurchase interests in approximately $100 billion of FFEL loans.75 
This amounted to a cash infusion by the government into the FFEL 
loan market to provide the needed capital to continue disbursing 
loans.76 This raised serious questions about the rationale of using 
private capital in the first place if bankers could not find funds for 
federally guaranteed student loans.77 
                                                 
70 See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 
110-317, at 45–47 (2007) (summarizing the changes to the FFEL program for 
interest rates and increased origination fees). 
71 H.R. REP. NO. 110-317, at 45–47. 
72 See Jason Delisle, Student Loan Purchase Programs Under the Ensuring 
Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 1 
(Dec. 2009), http://education.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policy
docs/Student_Loan_Purchase_Programs_Under_ECASLA.pdf [hereinafter 
ECASLA Programs]. 
73 Id. 
74 See U.S. DEPT. ED., ENSURING CONTINUED ACCESS TO STUDENT LOANS ACT OF 
2008 (ECALSA): ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2011), http://studentaid.ed
.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/July2011ECASLAReport.pdf; 
Ensuring Continued Access To Student Loans Act Of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
227, 122 Stat. 740 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
75 ECASLA Programs, supra note 72, at 3. 
76 Id. at 1. 
77 Imagine the doomsday scenario where students cannot get loans to pay for 
tuition and universities do not receive funds. That would remove tens of billions 
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The CCRAA also planted two seeds that have laid the foundation 
for alleviating student loan debt: the Income-Based Repayment 
(IBR)78 and Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF)79 programs. IBR 
allows any student after 2009 with direct or FFEL loans to pay only 
15% of their discretionary income towards the monthly payment and 
extends the term of the loan to 25 years.80 If there is a balance after 25 
years, then that debt is cancelled and fully booked as income in the 
year of cancellation.81 PSLF forgives only direct loan debt if the 
student works full-time at a qualifying public service job for 120 
months—ten years.82 A student can utilize the IBR plan for those ten 
years to reduce the monthly payment obligation and the forgiveness 
bypasses any taxable income from cancelled debt.83 
Neither of these concepts were new to federal aid programs. The 
Student Loan Reform Act of 1993 offered an income contingent 
repayment plan.84 The original NDEA program from 1958 also had 
loan forgiveness provisions for public school teachers.85 The CCRAA, 
however, simplified the requirements and expanded the number of 
people who could qualify for these programs. These changes were 
possible because the federal government owned the loans from the 
Direct Loan Program and had broader discretion to change the 
repayment conditions. As discussed later, this is a powerful public 
policy tool that provides great flexibility but also raises significant 
risks to predicting the long-term cost of federal student loans. 
                                                                                                                   
of dollars from the economy in one fell swoop and probably cause debt defaults 
or bankruptcies for some universities. 
78 College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 493C, 121 Stat. 
784, 792–95 (2007). 
79 College Cost Reduction and Access Act § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 800–01. 
80 See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 682.215(b)(1) (2013). 
81 See I.R.C. § 108 (2013) (income provision for the cancellation of debt). 
82 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219. 
83 FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID—U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 
FORGIVENESS Q & AS FOR BORROWERS 1 (2012), http://www.studentaid.ed.gov
/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgiveness-common-questions.pdf. 
84 Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 455(e), 107 Stat. 341, 
349–50 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087e (2012)). 
85 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAMS CRS-1 
(April 1, 2005), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32516_20040809.pdf. 
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D. Current Programs 
1. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010 
With the ECASLA program fresh in the background, President 
Obama and Congress enacted the Student Aid and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 2010 (SAFRA),86 which was a significant 
change in student loan policy. Under SAFRA, the Department was 
required to eliminate FFEL programs by 2010 and replace all federal 
student loans with the Direct Loan Program.87 Citing the FCRA 
accounting changes as the basis for its analysis, the CBO stated that 
this change to only direct lending would save the federal budget “$28 
billion over the 2010–2014 period and $58 billion over the 2010–2019 
period.”88 
More recently, the CBO estimated savings for fiscal years 2013 
and 2014 of $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively.89 In addition to 
this change to direct lending, the government further expanded the 
PLSF and IBR programs enacted in 2007. The Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) option reduced the IBR monthly payment to only 10% of 
discretionary income and shortened the repayment period to twenty 
instead of twenty-five years for new borrowers after October 1, 2007.90 
These payment changes were possible because they were tied to the 
savings from the switch to direct lending. The Direct Loan Program 
comprised about 30% of all student loans at the time SAFRA was 
                                                 
86 Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, tit. 
II, sub. A, 124 Stat. 1071 (2010). 
87 CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OFFICE, THE SAFRA ACT: EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN 
THE FY2010 BUDGET RECONCILIATION 1–2 (2010), http://www.aacc.nche.edu
/Advocacy/Documents/CRS%20SAFRA.pdf. 
88 Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to 
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, 6 (Mar. 20, 2010), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379
/amendreconprop.pdf (filed on CBO website). 
89 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO FEBRUARY 2013 BASELINE PROJECTIONS FOR THE 
STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM Table 1 (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files
/cbofiles/attachments/43913_StudentLoans.pdf. 
90 See generally 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087e(m) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2013); 34 
C.F.R. 685.209(a)(1)(iii) (New borrowers are defined as any student that did not 
have outstanding loans before October 1, 2007 which received any Direct Loan 
disbursements after October 1, 2011). 
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enacted, and the program rapidly expanded.91 During fiscal year 2012, 
the Department loaned $142 billion exclusively through direct loans.92 
2. Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013 
In a rare act of bipartisanship, Congress passed the Bipartisan 
Student Loan Certainty Act (SLCA) in August 2013.93 The legislation 
was signed into law by President Obama on August 9, 2013, and was 
retroactively effective on July 1, 2013.94 This legislation changed the 
interest rates of student loans from statutorily set interest rates of 
6.8%, for undergraduates and Stafford Graduate loans, and 7.9%, for 
parent loans and Plus loans for graduates, to a more flexible fixed rate 
based on the market rate of 10-Year Treasury Notes sold that year. The 
following chart compares the impact of the new legislation to previous 
loan rates: 
 
 Before SLCA
95 
(2006-2013) SLCA Rate
96     Rates  
2013-201497 
SLCA Cap on 
Fixed Rate98 
Undergraduate 
6.8%  
(3.4% from 
2011–2013) 
2.05% + 10-
Year Rate 3.86% 8.25% 
Graduate 
Student 
Stafford 
6.8% 3.6% + 10-Year Rate 5.41% 9.5% 
PLUS Loans 
(Graduate & 
Parent) 
7.9% 4.6% + 10-Year Rate 6.41% 10.5% 
                                                 
91 Student Loans Overview, supra note 34, at S-13 (New Student Loan Volume 
During 2009). 
92 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL 
REPORT 57 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/2012report/agency
-financial-report.pdf. This number includes consolidations through SAFRA, 
without the consolidations the government disbursed $105 billion to 11 million 
students. FSA 2012 BUDGET, supra note 41, at 9. 
93 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7)–(8). 
94 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8). 
95 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(7). 
96 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8). 
97 Calculators & Interest Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.—FEDERAL STUDENT AID, 
http://www.direct.ed.gov/calc.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
98 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8). 
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The legislation was a response to the return of higher 
undergraduate interest rates, previously set at 3.4% from July 2011 to 
July 2013, to 6.8%.99 The immediate effect was to lower the interest 
rates for all new disbursements during the 2013–2014 academic year. 
The SLCA also introduced market-pricing to student loans by allowing 
the possibility for interest rates to go up to 8.25% for undergraduates, 
9.5% for some graduate loans, and 10.5% for parent and some 
graduate loans.100 The interest rate cap of 8.25% for loan consolidation 
was removed to allow for the potentially higher market-based rates on 
loans in the future.101 In essence, the SCLA reduced the long-term risk 
of inflation—i.e., increased Treasury Note rates—for student loans 
originated by the federal government while also providing a short-term 
reduction in interest rates for current students. The SLCA required the 
Government Accountability Office to perform a detailed study to 
determine “the actual cost to the Federal Government of carrying out 
the Federal student loan programs.”102 The law also requires a separate 
cost breakdown of loan administrative costs, interest rates, and other 
terms.103 
Despite the relatively short history of federal student loans, two 
policy trends are evident. First, the method of lending money to 
students is predicated almost entirely on the budgetary treatment of the 
program. The FFEL program was created in the Higher Education 
Amendments of 1965 to reduce the budgetary impact of NDEA loans 
to expand access to more students at a lower cost. The Direct Loan 
Program of 1993 was only created after the accounting changes of 
FCRA in 1990. President Obama’s push for an exclusive Direct Loan 
Program, with its flexible repayment plans, was due primarily to the 
program’s positive impact on the budget.104 SLCA reduced current 
                                                 
99 See Equal Justice Works, Student Loan Act Could Mean Higher Federal Profits, 
U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-
loan-ranger/2013/08/14/student-loan-act-could-mean-higher-federal-profits; 20 
U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(7)(D)(v). 
100 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8). 
101 § 1087e(b)(8)(D). 
102 See Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127 
Stat. 506, § 4. 
103 Id. 
104 Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/us
/politics/31obama.html. See generally Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: 
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interest rates for students by allowing increases in the future based on 
market-based rates.105 Second, the government fills an important 
need—not met by private lenders because of risk—by providing loans 
to students either directly or through credit enhancements to prevent 
underinvestment of human capital.106 
Based on this historical analysis, any discussion about reforming 
student loans must revolve around its impact to the budget. If policy 
makers want to change student loan policies, they must change how 
such programs are accounted through FCRA and make adjustments to 
risk analysis. 
III. GOVERNMENT RISKS 
There are two general policy issues confronting current student 
loan programs. First, the loan programs have placed an inordinate 
amount of risk with the federal government. The programs have 
burdened the federal balance sheet with roughly $1 trillion in risky 
student loan debt. For the annual budget, the programs inaccurately 
reduce costs through inflated negative subsidies107 that do not fully 
encompass the true cost of the lending programs. Second, the federal 
government, through the triad of quality education regulators and 
failed Gainful Employment Regulations,108 has been incapable of 
closing the educational quality feedback loop between uninformed 
                                                                                                                   
Why Congress Should Allow College Students to Borrow More Through Federal 
Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 58–59 (2011) (asserting 
that direct funding from the federal government would allow the government to 
retain control over the loans and institute flexibility in the repayment options). 
105 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8) (tying interest rates for various loans to the ten-year 
treasury bond rate plus an additional percentage). 
106 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 102. 
107 The term “negative subsidy” is used in the federal budget to describe a program 
that returns more money to the program than the cost allocated. Hence, a real 
subsidy is the actual budgetary cost of a program to the federal government 
whereas a negative subsidy is the amount added to the federal budget from the 
program. In layman terms, a negative subsidy is the fictional “profit” from the 
program which can be used to offset other costs, such as increased Pell Grants. 
See generally, 2014 Department of Education Budget Proposal, supra note 54 at 
S-11. 
108 Gainful Employment Regulations encompass the regulations set forth by the 
Secretary of Education so that educational institutions can receive federal funds. 
See generally 34 C.F.R. § 668.8 (2013) (providing reporting regulations for 
schools regarding gainful employment statistics). 
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students, federal student loans, and academic institutions that bear 
minimal risk for such loans. This transfers the risk of providing a 
quality education to the federal government even though the 
government is restricted in its ability to regulate academic institutions 
for quality. 
Legal scholars109 aptly have outlined other problems with student 
loan programs, such as students being burdened with greater student 
loan debt as a result of higher tuition costs.110 This increase in tuition 
costs is prevalent especially in the for-profit sector of higher 
education.111 While there are many factors at play, this increase can be 
attributed to inadequate incentives for institutions to control their 
program costs. Former U.S. Department of Education Secretary 
William Bennett proffered a similar explanation for the continued 
tuition increases.112 He suggested that federal aid allows tuition 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., Wimberg, supra note 5, at 194 (citing Daniel L. Bennett, New College 
Loan Rules Put Taxpayers at Risk, FORBES.COM (May 10, 2010, 6:00 PM), 
http:// www.forbes.com/2010/05/10/student-loans-safra-leadership-education-
bennett.html) (taxpayer investment in the financial aid programs are failing to 
produce societal benefits); Roots, supra note 28, at 511–12 (stating that few 
people would deny that federal aid is directly responsible for the rising costs of 
college education). 
110 See Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited Apr. 5, 
2013). 
111 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded 
Subprime Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 457–58 (2012) 
(citations omitted) (noting that students who attend for-profit colleges are 
burdened with higher debts and default rates than those students who attend 
public or nonprofit institutions); Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal 
Reform of the For-Profit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 528–29 
(2012) (citations omitted) (highlighting the exploitive practices engaged in by 
for-profit institutions coupled with the for-profit students’ heightened loan debt 
and diminished employment prospects). 
112 William J. Bennett, Opinion, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/18/opinion/our-greedy-colleges.html?page
wanted=all&src=pm (“If anything, increases in financial aid in recent years have 
enabled colleges and universities [to blithely] raise their tuitions, confident that 
Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the increase.”). But see generally 
ANDREW GILLEN, FINANCIAL AID IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY IT IS 
INEFFECTIVE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2009), http://www.centerfor
collegeaffordability.org/uploads/Financial_Aid_in_Theory_and_Practice%281
%29.pdf (critiquing William Bennett’s theory as too broad because it treats all 
federal financial aid as equal causes of rising tuition costs). 
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inflation to occur because the federal government provides aid in the 
form of grants and loans to match the costs of education and the 
institutions have little incentive to rein in costs.113 In other words, 
there is a break down in incentives to institutions because they do not 
substantially bear the risk of unsuccessful educational outcomes for 
students such as when the student does not repay the debt. While there 
are other problems with student loans, budget risks and closing this 
feedback loop on educational quality require further examination to 
produce successful reforms in which all actors in higher education will 
have similarly aligned incentives for positive educational outcomes. 
A. Federal Accounting and Budget Risks 
This section will address in greater detail how the federal budget 
currently impacts student loan policy and, conversely, how student 
loans may impact the budget. This section will analyze the following: 
(1) how accrual accounting impacts the federal budget and its potential 
pitfalls; (2) two looming issues for financial aid: fair-value accounting 
and impending costs or write-downs; and (3) how to reduce accounting 
and write-down risks through changes in public policy. 
The current federal structure for student loans differs from most 
government assistance programs. By more than a two-to-one margin, 
the government has preferred loan guarantee programs over direct 
ownership of loan obligations.114 The government provides loan 
guarantees in the following markets: residential mortgages through 
FHA loans and VA loans; small businesses through SBA loans; and 
various loan programs for international trade.115 Of the direct loans 
and guarantees programs, student loans have the largest percentage of 
negative subsidies due to the way the costs are calculated through 
FCRA.116 In fiscal year 2012, student loans from the Direct Loan 
Program comprised 78% of all credit receivables—$673 billion out of 
                                                 
113 See Bennet, supra note 112; see also William S. Howard, The Student Loan 
Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law School, 7 J. OF L. ECON. & POLICY 485, 
496–97 (2011) (describing higher education as an inelastic good which is not 
effected by price increases). 
114 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, 2012 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 67–
68 (2012), http://www.fms.treas.gov/fr/12frusg/12frusg.pdf [hereinafter 2012 
U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT]. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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$859 billion—on the federal balance sheet.117 In the same year, the 
number of student loans managed by the federal government ballooned 
to $948 billion118 with loans to 38 million individuals. 119 These loans 
are considered an asset on the federal balance sheet with the estimated 
repayments comprising roughly 30% of the federal government’s 
assets.120 Student loans, once an afterthought with restricted funding, 
are now the focus of fiscal and public policy debates because of their 
impact on the overall federal budget. 
1. Accrual Accounting & Fair-Value Estimates for Direct 
Loans 
As stated in Part II, the most significant recent change in federal 
student aid was the FCRA, which mandated accrual accounting for 
credit programs.121 The FCRA requires the government to record the 
lifetime cost of federal credit programs, such as federal student loans, 
on an up-front accrual basis.122 For the purposes of budgeting the cost 
of student loans, this means that the Department must estimate the 
long-term costs of the loan when it is first disbursed.123 The FCRA 
defines the cost for a federal credit program, such as a student loan, as 
the “estimated long-term cost to the Government of a direct loan or 
loan guarantee . . . calculated on net present value basis, excluding 
administrative costs and any incidental effects on governmental 
receipts or outlays.”124 
                                                 
117 Id. 
118 FSA 2012 Budget, supra note 41, at 77. 
119 Id. at 9. 
120 2012 U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 114, at iv. 
121 See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. V, 104 Stat. 
1388-610 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 661(a)–(f) (2012)); Federal 
Student Loan Cost Estimates, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://febp
.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-cost-estimates (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Federal Student Loan Estimates]. 
122 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF FEDERAL 
CREDIT PROGRAMS IN 2013 2 (2012), http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/attachments/FairValue_One-Col.pdf. 
123 James M. Bickley, Budgetary Treatment of Federal Credit (Direct Loans and 
Loan Guarantees): Concepts, History, and Issues for the 112th Congress, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV. 1 (Jul. 27, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42632.pdf. 
124 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A) (2012). 
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This is a form of accrual accounting in two ways: (1) the 
government estimates on a regular basis its expected future payments 
minus doubtful accounts; and (2) the estimated loss/gain is discounted 
to a present value based on a discount rate. The estimated cost is then 
translated into the annual budget as a subsidy. If the estimated loan 
payments are more than the estimated cost, then this is referred to in 
the federal budget as a negative subsidy.125 Currently, for every $1 
loaned to a student, the federal government expects to receive $1.32 in 
repayment, $.32 of which is a negative subsidy.126 Below is a list 
created by the CBO and compiled by the New America Foundation of 
subsidy cost estimates for fiscal year 2013 showing an overall negative 
subsidy of $36.5 billion:127 
 
Federal Student Loan Volume and Subsidy Cost Estimates, 
Fiscal Year 2013128 
 
Loan Type Subsidy Rate 
New Volume 
(billions) 
Costs 
(billions) 
Subsidized Stafford Loans -15.1% $30.4 -$4.6 
Unsubsidized Stafford Loans -33.8% $60.9 -$20.6 
GradPLUS Loans -57.8% $9.1 -$5.3 
Parent PLUS Loans -49.8% $12.3 -$6.1 
Total -32.4% $112.7 -$36.5 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, supra note 34, at S-7 (“A negative subsidy occurs 
when the present value of cash inflows to the Government is estimated to exceed 
the present value of cash outflows. In that case, the Federal Government is 
earning more than it is spending.”). 
126 Federal Student Loan Estimates, supra note 121; see also Memorandum from 
Congressional Budget Office titled March 2012 Baseline Budget Account 
Totals, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Mar. 13, 2012), http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files
/cbofiles/attachments/43054_StudentLoanPellGrantPrograms.pdf. 
127 Federal Student Loan Estimates, supra note 121. 
128 Id. 
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The FCRA calculation also discounts the future cash flows into 
present dollar terms. A net present value calculation is based on the 
theory that money today is more valuable than money in the future; 
thus, future cash flows are discounted to compensate for the cost of 
borrowing, riskiness of the investment, and other factors.129 Under the 
FCRA, the present value of future cash flows can be calculated in the 
following way: 
 
 
Present Value130  =    Total Future Payments / 
(1 + Discount Rate )(Number of Years) 
Discount Rate      =  Average Interest Rate on Marketable 
Treasury Securities of Similar Maturity131 
(i.e., 10-year Treasury Notes at roughly 2%) 
Future Payments =  Estimated Payment of Principal, Interest 
Accrued, Penalties, Fees, and Doubtful 
Accounts (losses)132 
 
Not Included: Market Risk of Loans,133 or Administrative Costs 
(including collections costs) of loan programs134 
 
To make this calculation, the Department fills the variables in the 
above net present value formula based on the loan amount, the 
expected repayment of principal, and the interest and other payments 
over the life of the loan—penalties, fees, or defaults.135 Agencies must 
recalculate these estimates on a regular basis.136 
The accounting treatment and net present value calculations have 
been extensively covered by the CBO, the Congressional Research 
                                                 
129 CBO SUBSIDY ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at 10. 
130 See Bickley, supra note 123, at 18. 
131 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(E) (2012). 
132 See id. at § 661a(5)(B). 
133 See Bickley, supra note 123. 
134 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A). 
135 See id. § 661a(5)(B). 
136 See id. § 661c (“There is hereby provided permanent indefinite authority for 
these reestimates.”). 
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Service (CRS), and the New America Foundation.137 Based on their 
research, federal interest rates are the primary reason for negative 
subsidies for student loans.138 A CRS Report explained the primary 
reason for the subsidy: “This high negative subsidy level was due 
primarily to the use of Treasury interest rates to discount future credit 
flows.”139 In other words, the government is borrowing money at 
historically low levels from the Treasury Department and then 
charging interest on its student loans at rates ranging from 3.4% to 
7.9%, plus fees. This kind of arbitrage has greatly reduced the 
budgetary cost of student loans. 
Instead of using the treasury rate for the discount rate, experts have 
pushed for assigning a discount rate based on the market risk of the 
loans—in other words, the risk of default.140 The inclusion of the 
administrative costs for servicing loans would also reduce the negative 
subsidy and more accurately reflect the cost of the programs.141 These 
reforms to the FCRA formula sometimes are referred to as Fair-Value 
Estimates.142 Republican House Representatives have unsuccessfully 
attempted to reform the FCRA in the 2014 Budget by proposing the 
adoption of fair-value accounting principles.143 The SLCA further 
demonstrated this push for fair-value accounting for federal student 
loans by using market-based interest rates and commissioning a 
Government Accountability Office study to provide an accurate 
estimate of student loan costs, including administrative costs.144 As 
such, it appears the current FCRA method of calculating subsidies is 
                                                 
137 CBO SUBSIDY ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at 10; Federal Student Loan 
Estimates, supra note 121; Bickley, supra note 123, at 13. 
138 See, e.g., Bickley, supra note 123, at 15. 
139 Id. 
140 Federal Student Loan Estimates, supra note 121. 
141 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING FOR FEDERAL CREDIT 
PROGRAMS 10–11 (2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attach
ments/03-05-FairValue_Brief.pdf [hereinafter FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING]. 
142 Id. 
143 The Path to Prosperity: A Responsible Balanced Budget, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. 
51 (Mar. 2013), http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy14budget.pdf 
(discussing the use of fair-value scoring to properly evaluate taxpayer risk from 
government backed housing loans). 
144 Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127 Stat. 
506, § 4. 
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beginning to be confronted by Congress and will require re-estimates 
of costs and subsidies or eventual unbudgeted write-downs. 
2. Underestimated Costs of Programs and Increased Treasury 
Rates 
There are two looming issues that could seriously impact the 
federal student loan cost structure which have not properly been taken 
into account through the FCRA. First, new federal programs such as 
IBR,145 PAYE,146 and PSLF147 modify the repayment estimates 
negatively, and these changes have not been fully factored into FCRA 
subsidy estimates. 
Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 661a(9), agencies are required to recalculate 
cash flows when a modification occurs.148 This includes budgetary 
impacts “resulting from new legislation, or from the exercise of 
administrative discretion under existing law, that directly or indirectly 
alters the estimated cost of outstanding direct loans (or direct loan 
obligations) or loan guarantees (or loan guarantee commitments) such 
as a change in collection procedures.”149 
The IBR, PAYE, and PSLF programs modified the FCRA 
calculations, but the Department has not fully incorporated these 
changes into its long-term cost estimates. For example, a number of 
policy experts have noted that the IBR program allows many students 
to take on large amounts of graduate school debt with reduced risk of 
repayment.150 One Barclays study estimated the cost of the programs 
                                                 
145 20 U.S.C. § 1098e; 34 C.F.R. § 685.221 (2013). 
146 See, e.g., SAFRA Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1071, 1081 
(2010) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2008)) (changes effective July 1, 2014); 
34 C.F.R. § 685.209; Help Americans Manage Student Loan Debt, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011
/10/25/fact-sheet-help-americans-manage-student-loan-debt (President Obama 
used his executive authority to move up the implementation of Pay-As-You-
Earn to starting in 2012 with any loans disbursed after October 1, 2007). 
147 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219. 
148 2 U.S.C. § 661a(9) (2012). 
149 Id. 
150 See, e.g., Kelly Edmiston, et al, Student Loans: Overview and Issues (Update), 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 14 (Apr. 2013), http://www
.kansascityfed.org/publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwp%2012-05.pdf; Jason Delisle & 
Alex Holt, Safety Net or Windfall? Examining Changes to Income-Based 
Repayment for Federal Student Loans, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 11, 13 (Oct. 
2012), http://edmoney.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs
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to be around $300 billion over the next ten years.151 The report 
estimated, based on research from a study by the Kansas City Federal 
Reserve, that roughly half of students would utilize the IBR programs, 
whereas the Department currently estimates that only 6% of students 
will do so.152 
The Department has underestimated the size of the IBR program 
participation and has not fully recognized the cost because of overly-
optimistic estimates. In 2007, when the IBR Program was introduced, 
the CBO estimated its cost at $1.9 billion through 2017.153 The CBO 
also estimated that this cost would be offset by students utilizing direct 
loans, which have more favorable budgetary treatment than FFEL 
loans.154 For the new PLSF program, the Department estimated the 
cost to be $2.1 billion from 2012 to 2021, or roughly $233 million per 
year.155 
When the annual cost estimates of the IBR and PLSF programs are 
combined, the cost to the U.S. taxpayers is less than $1 billion per year 
and less than 1% of the estimated $100 billion in annually disbursed 
loans. This cost estimate must be recalculated as it becomes clear that 
more students will pursue these options. Additionally, a student using 
the IBR hides default risk by extending the recognition event until the 
loan is officially cancelled after twenty to twenty-five years.156 
                                                                                                                   
/NAF_Income_Based_Repayment.pdf (noting that many graduates that are not 
“struggling” are taking advantage of current IBR rates); Matt Leichter, Income-
Based Repayment: Lifeline for Law Graduates, Certain Loser for Government, 
THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com
/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202574613758&IncomeBased_Repayment_Lifeline_f
or_Law_Graduates_Certain_Loser_for_Government. 
151 Jason Delisle, Barclays Student Loan Report: New Income Based Repayment 
Enrollment to Balloon, $235 Billion Hidden Cost, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, 
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://edmoney.newamerica.net/blogposts/2012/barclays
_student_loan_report_new_income_based_repayment_enrollment_to_balloon_
cost_75. 
152 Id. 
153 Delisle & Holt, supra note 150, at 38 n.13. 
154 Id. 
155 Proposed Rulemaking for Student Loan Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,086, 42,087, 
42,122 (July 17, 2012). 
156 For example, if an individual earns $10,000 per year then he or she has no 
obligation to make payments on his or her student loans and his or her loan 
balance would be cancelled after twenty years. That individual will never be 
delinquent or in default of his or her student loans despite never making a 
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The second looming budgetary risk is that the current discount rate 
does not reflect the riskiness of the student loans. As stated above, the 
primary reason for the negative subsidy for the past couple of years is 
that interest rates for treasury notes have been at historic lows.157 The 
discount rate is tied to the federal treasury rates, so any increase in 
federal rates will correspondingly reduce the negative subsidy for 
direct loan programs.158 Eventually, federal interest rate increases will 
trigger additional subsidy costs, and the government will need to 
allocate funding to cover such costs. If the FCRA discount rate is 
redefined to include the fair value of the riskiness of student loans, this 
also will lead to additional subsidy costs in the federal budget. Because 
these are unsecured loans, this change in the discount rate probably 
will be significant but also necessary to properly estimate the cost of 
the student loan programs. 
The SLCA has helped reduce the budget risk of increasing federal 
treasury rates by tying new loan origination interest rates to increases 
in the 10-Year Treasury Note rates.159 This legislation is a great 
example of an effort to use short-term federal costs to achieve long-
term budget stability, and it also demonstrates the viability of student 
loan reform so long as it favorably impacts the budget and balance 
sheet. The legislation also shows the willingness of Congress to 
introduce a market-based pricing mechanism into the student loan 
market to mitigate federal risks. 
The CBO estimates that the SLCA will have a short-term 
budgetary cost of $8 billion and $12 billion in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively.160 By 2023, the SLCA is projected to save the federal 
government an overall $715 million from increased student loan rates 
because of projected increases in 10-Year Treasury Note rates.161 The 
real savings here is not the $715 million projected over eleven years 
but rather the elimination of the budgetary uncertainty caused by 
                                                                                                                   
payment, so long as that individual submits the requisite filings under the 
Income-Based Repayment plan. 
157 Bickley, supra note 123, at 11. 
158 See id. 
159 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b) (2012). 
160 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO ESTIMATE OF THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THE 
BIPARTISAN STUDENT LOAN CERTAINTY ACT OF 2013 (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/Bipartisan%20Stu
dent%20Loan%20Certainty%20Act%20of%202013.pdf. 
161 Id. 
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increases of federal interest rates for the FCRA subsidy estimate 
calculations.162 Although this mitigates some budget risk from 
increased federal interest rates, the SLCA fails to tie the student loan 
rates to the actual riskiness of the student loans. It also does not 
address the inaccurate FCRA estimates for roughly $1 trillion of 
student loans already in existence. 
Most experts, including the CBO, agree that the government 
should use a fair-value approach for the accounting treatment of 
student loans.163 Risks ranging from imprecise accounting treatments 
to unrecognized costs will cause significant changes in the federal 
balance sheet and budget. The question then becomes: who should 
bear this greater risk and potential cost? Additionally, are there ways 
to limit the cost to the government while also creating better incentives 
in the student loan market? The federal government should be 
evaluating different methods: (1) to reduce its risk exposure to almost 
$1 trillion in student loans; (2) to accurately prepare budgets for future 
student loan costs; and (3) to use policy tools to incentivize positive 
educational outcomes. 
B. Risks Stemming From a Lack of Quality Education 
Control 
The second policy issue confronting current student loan programs 
is the federal government’s inability to connect the educational 
outcome feedback loop by tying together the interest of the students, 
the accreditors, the student loan originators—currently the federal 
government—and the regulators. This section summarizes the federal 
government’s failed attempts to regulate educational quality and 
briefly analyzes alternative quality education indicator mechanisms 
such as risk-based pricing, put-options, and cost sharing with States. 
1. Failed Federal Regulation of Quality Education 
From the inception of financial aid through the G.I. Bill and the 
Higher Education Act, the federal government has delegated quality 
control to states or accreditors.164 In its effort to protect taxpayer 
                                                 
162 See David P. Smole, An Examination of Student Loan Interest Rate Proposals in 
the 113th Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 30 (Jul. 26, 2013), http://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43094.pdf (explaining how increased federal interest 
rates impact subsidy cost estimates and market-based rates can limit that cost). 
163 FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING, supra note 141, at 1. 
164 See discussion, supra Part II.A. 
38 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 6 
dollars and push education reform, the Department has occasionally 
focused its regulation on quality education indicators in for-profit 
postsecondary academic institutions. These policies have had mixed 
results. 
Starting in the 1990s, federal regulators attempted to rein in bad 
acting institutions through minimal requirements to enroll students, 
such as the Ability to Benefit test and Cohort Default Rate 
regulations.165 The Department’s most recent foray into quality 
education imposed more stringent and measurable restrictions on 
proprietary, for-profit institutions through the 2010 Gainful 
Employment Regulations (GER).166 The GER stated, inter alia, that 
student loan repayment rates must be at least 35% and annual 
repayment must be less than or equal to 30% of the borrower’s 
discretionary income or less than or equal to 12% of annual 
earnings.167 If the institution failed both measures for three out of four 
years, then it would lose access to financial aid, including loan 
programs.168 
This attempt to regulate for-profit institutions based on learning 
outcomes—repayment rates based on income—was circumvented 
when the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the promulgated regulations in 
July 2012.169 The Court ruled that the 35% repayment rate was not 
based on the agency record and was therefore arbitrary and in violation 
of the Administrative Procedures Act.170 Although the Court vacated 
all of GER, the Department intends to promulgate the new rules in the 
                                                 
165 See 34 C.F.R. § 668.32(e) (2012) (listing requirements for student eligibility for 
loan assistance, including the “ability to benefit” test); id. §§ 668.181–668.197, 
668.200–668.217 (establishing regulations for cohort default rates). 
166 See generally Gainful Employment Information, DEP’T OF EDUCATION, 
http://ifap.ed.gov/GainfulEmploymentInfo/ (last visited May 15, 2013) 
[hereinafter Gainful Employment Information] (comprehensive resource for 
statutes, regulations, and agency commentary on Gainful Employment). 
167 See 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(a) (invalidated by Ass’n of Private Colleges & Univs. v. 
Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012)) (vacating that portion of the 
regulation that required student loan repayment rates to be over 35% on the 
grounds that the rate was “arbitrary and capricious”). 
168 Id. § 668.7(i). 
169 Ass’n of Private Colleges & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
170 Id. at 154 (“Because the Department has not provided a reasonable explanation 
of that figure, the court must conclude that it was chosen arbitrarily.”). 
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future.171 While GER was vacated, the separate disclosure provisions 
were not.172 Federal officials have refocused the Department’s 
oversight function to promoting transparency instead of substantive 
quality standards.173 
The recent push for greater direct regulation of education quality 
has failed even though GER was a step in the right direction. Federal 
regulators have had limited success at determining quality of 
education, either because they cannot react fast enough—the 
proverbial “whack-a-mole” problem174—or because they are restricted 
by law against direct regulation.175 Also, these regulations have 
focused only on for-profit institutions, which are required to show 
their educations lead to “gainful employment.” This has left non-profit 
and public institutions largely unregulated for student loan repayment 
and stricter disclosure standards. The federal government, due to 
administrative law and its own bureaucratic process, has not been able 
to implement regulations to provide quality education indicators. Other 
quality indicators, especially indicators set outside federal regulation, 
could provide a much better quality of education indicator to students, 
educators, and regulators. 
2. Alternative Mechanisms for Educational Quality Control 
There have been other proposals to insert indicators based on 
student loan repayment rates to close the quality education feedback 
loop. Aside from the failed GER mentioned above, academics have 
proposed implementing risk-based pricing, put-options for earnings 
outcomes, and risk sharing through the states. All of these proposals 
                                                 
171 See Gainful Employment Information, supra note 166. 
172 See, e.g., 34 CFR § 668.6(a); Memorandum from Jeff Baker, Director, Policy 
Liaison and Implementation, Federal Student Aid regarding Status of Gainful 
Employment Regulations (Jul. 6, 2012), http://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements
/070612GE39StatusofGainfulEmploymentRegs.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
173 See Memorandum from David Bergeron, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Post-
Secondary Educ., Gainful Employment Electronic Announcement #42 – 2011-
2012 Disclosures for Gainful Employment Programs (Nov. 23, 2012), 
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/112312GEAnnounce42Disclosureof
GEPrograms1112.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
174 See generally Fawn Johnson, ‘Whack-a-Mole’ Continues on For-Profit 
Colleges, NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 2, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/-
whack-a-mole-continues-on-for-profit-colleges-20110204. 
175 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2012) (barring federal control of educational 
institutions). 
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help form the policy background to create a market-based indicator to 
close the educational quality feedback loop. 
a. Risk-Based Pricing 
Professor Michael Simkovic has proposed introducing risk-based 
pricing on student loans to reduce student loan debt and to provide 
students with educational outcome indicators.176 Conceptually, risk-
based pricing assigns different interest rates on student loans based on 
a number of indicators used to predict the borrower’s credit risk.177 
Risk-based interest rates could be based on a borrower’s choice of 
major,178 class rank, test scores,179 or, to a lesser extent, on the specific 
characteristics of the institution.180 For example, a student studying in 
a STEM major—science, technology, engineering, or math—would 
have a lower interest rate on his or her loans than a student studying 
the humanities, journalism, or law.181 This differential in interest rates 
would signal to students the riskiness of the debt and also the 
likelihood of employment and earnings in the field. 
The approach described in a 2012 Note published in Harvard Law 
Review differs somewhat in its treatment of risk-based factors by 
focusing solely on post-graduation employment prospects through two 
factors: (1) quality of education; and (2) the area of study.182 The Note 
proposed using an updated Cohort Default Rate defined by the federal 
government to determine institutional quality.183 A Cohort Default rate 
is defined by statute and regulation and determines the percentage of 
individuals from the same institution that have defaulted on their 
student loans.184 The Note also suggested using two factors to 
determine the riskiness of a course of study: (1) average wages from a 
certain major; and (2) debt-to-income ratios.185 
                                                 
176 Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530; see also Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 588–89. 
177 Simkovic, supra note 1, at 596–97. 
178 Id. at 625. 
179 Id. at 630–31 & nn. 282–84. 
180 Id. at 622–23. 
181 Id. at 625. 
182 Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 599. 
183 Id. at 599–600. 
184 20 U.S.C. § 1085(m) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.181–668.197, 668.200–668.217 
(2012). 
185 Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 600. 
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Risk-based pricing would indicate to student borrowers which 
areas of study have more repayment risk than others.186 This approach 
is laudable because it attempts to close the feedback loop between 
students, educators, and government officials by guiding educational 
preferences more efficiently. Also, it presumably will reduce 
repayment risks to the federal government. 
The problem with risk-based pricing is that it introduces risk to 
signal quality education at precisely the wrong place—the student. It is 
very unlikely that a prospective student will rationally weigh the 
varying interest rates for programs to make an informed choice based 
on a risk-reward analysis. While it is true that college shopping by 
students and families take up a considerable amount of time already, 
the addition of risk-based interest rates per program, per school, or 
both would add another layer of complexity. Thus, different interest 
rates may not necessarily get the desired result of students making 
better decisions.187 
Federally set risk-based pricing may also violate 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232a, which bars federal control over programs or curriculum, 
because it would unduly influence an institution’s autonomy. Further, 
if the rates are based on risk and are efficiently priced, then it is 
unclear why federal funding is required instead of just private loans—
unless the risk-based pricing only slightly accounts for the loan risk 
and there is still a government subsidy. 
b. Institutional Put-Option – Risk-Sharing with Market 
Based Pricing 
A recent proposal to reform student loans by Michael C. 
Macchiarola and Arun Abraham encompasses the best public policy 
incentives while also providing a mechanism to provide educational 
quality indicators to academic institutions.188 In their paper, which 
focuses on law schools exclusively but easily could be expanded to all 
higher education, they propose that institutions should give students a 
                                                 
186 See id. at 598. 
187 See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 624 (noting that some relative levels of risk 
associated with a given student may be based on factors that are beyond that 
particular student’s control and outside the scope of his or her educational 
decisions). 
188 Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 119. 
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put-option to guarantee certain minimum earnings over a period of 
time.189 
A put-option is a contract between two parties that gives the 
buyer—student—“the right, but not the obligation, to sell (to the put 
seller) an underlying security or other item of value at an agreed-upon 
price.”190 Macchiarola and Abraham logically matched expected 
earnings with what a student would have to earn to repay the student 
loans within a standard ten year payment schedule if the student paid 
only fifteen percent of his or her disposable income.191 This 
calculation mirrors the IBR payment plan.192 If the earnings are less 
than the expected amount, then the student can exercise the put-option 
to have the school pay the difference between the student’s expected 
minimum earnings and lower actual earnings.193 
A put-option bought by universities based on expected earnings of 
students is both groundbreaking and logically sound.194 Who better to 
bear a portion of the risk of a student loan than the institution that 
provides the service? Because of the informational asymmetry, 
institutions are better risk-bearers than individual students for adverse 
outcomes tied to student loans.195 Also, the put-option is based on 
individual outcomes, so the institution has a vested interest in 
encouraging students with high debt levels to choose prudent majors 
for better career options. The problems with the put-option are as 
follows: (1) it is too complicated to implement on a student-per-
student basis; and (2) institutions, which would bear the cost, do not 
have an incentive or requirement to implement the program. 
c. Cost Sharing with States: A Roadmap from the 1990s 
The concept of closing the educational feedback loop by 
financially tying student loan repayment rates to state and institutional 
performances has been tried before with bipartisan support. In 1991, 
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George H. W. Bush proposed in his budget a “risk sharing” plan, 
where states would have to compensate the federal government for 
poorly-performing student loans from institutions licensed within each 
state.196 The proposal became law in 1993 when Congress amended 
Section 428 of the Higher Education Act by adding subsection (n), 
titled “Cost Sharing by States.”197 Somewhat bold at the time, the 
amendment made states pay a portion of the losses from student loans 
tied to institutions with a 20% or more cohort default rate.198 Starting 
in 1995, the state would be forced to pay 12.5% of the student loan 
losses from institutions that exceeded the 20% threshold default 
rate.199 This rate would then increase to the state paying 50% of any 
excess over the 20% threshold default rate.200 The amendment also 
allowed states to charge fees, subject to the Department’s approval, to 
institutions based on institutions’ cohort default rates and states’ risk 
of having to pay the loan losses.201 
This provided an indirect method of closing the educational 
feedback loop for poorly-performing schools. If institutions 
collectively had a default rate higher than 20%, then the state would 
have been exposed to liability for some of the defaulted student loan 
losses. States have the power to approve institutions operating in their 
                                                 
196 Mary Crystal Cage, Bush Proposes That States Share Risks of Student Loans, 
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197 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4201, 107 
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institutions within that state. 
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state,202 so the federal law assumed each state would be able to put 
pressure on poorly performing institutions to improve. The 
Department attempted to promulgate regulations to clarify the statute 
but later withdrew the proposed regulations.203 
This cost sharing scheme was repealed in 1998.204 It is unclear 
whether this policy was ever fully implemented or if it had any 
success.205 Part of the concern was that the federal government 
imposed a fee on the states for defaulting loans even though states 
have little direct authority, outside of institutional approval, to set 
quality standards.206 
IV. HISTORY OF STUDENT LOAN SECURITIZATION 
Any successful student loan reform must provide a feedback 
mechanism to encourage positive education outcomes while also 
reducing government risk from student loans. Securitization 
potentially can fulfill both of these requirements. As to the first 
requirement, securitization will force third-party pricing of the student 
loan assets based on expected repayment rates. This will create a 
market-based price to gauge the quality of education for institutions or 
programs. 
Repayment rates of student loans, as used in the past with GER 
and the alternative proposals, have not been implemented with the 
proper incentive structures or feedback mechanisms. A third-party 
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pricing mechanism, where institutions retain some of the risk of 
student loans, provides incentives to institutions to change their 
behavior to achieve better educational outcomes and repayment rates. 
The government already has demonstrated a willingness to use third-
party pricing mechanisms to set student loan interest rates.207 While 
certainly imperfect, this type of quality education indicator provides 
direct feedback to students, regulators, and officials and bypasses 
concerns about the federal government directly regulating the quality 
of education. 
As to the second requirement, the federal government, through 
securitization, could reduce its exposure to risk by selling all or a 
portion of its $1 trillion direct loan portfolio to private investors. From 
a budgetary standpoint, there are two reasons for selling student loans 
to third parties. First, by selling the loans, the risk exposure to the 
federal government is reduced proportionally. As demonstrated in the 
discussion of FCRA estimates, the federal government has struggled to 
accurately monitor or price loan risks. Selling some of these assets 
would reduce the impact of this risk. Second, by selling the loans, the 
federal government is capitalizing assets that can be used either to 
make more loans, fund other federal programs, or to pay off debt. 
Here, the benefits become even more apparent: if the Department 
sells $500 billion in student loans, it could reduce the federal debt—
issued to pay out the loans in the first place—and increase its available 
revenue. This one-time benefit could be used strategically at a time of 
fiscal crisis to raise money, much like a corporation sells assets to 
recapitalize its balance sheet.208 Currently, there is a robust market for 
third-party investment in student loans and the federal government 
could capitalize on this demand while reducing risk.209 The following 
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sections analyze whether securitization of federal direct loans has been 
attempted in the past and whether such an approach would be feasible 
in terms of public policy and the federal budget. 
A. Securitization Principles 
Securitization is a vague term that courts, federal officials, and 
scholars have struggled to define. This lack of definition makes it hard 
for parties to understand their contractual obligations, rights, and risks. 
Notably, the term “securitization” has not even been defined by the 
most recent reform to financial regulations, Dodd-Frank.210 In broad 
terms, securitization is the pooling of payable accounts—accounts 
receivable, mortgages, credit card receivables, student loans—into one 
legal entity to hold the assets, which are collectively sold to third 
parties as one diversified investment. Simplified, the structure of 
securitization looks like this: 
 
Inputs  Structure  Outputs 
 
Jonathon Lipson recently defined securitization more narrowly by 
distinguishing true securitization in a legal sense from other similar 
capital structures. In his article, RE: Defining Securitization, he 
provides this overarching definition: 
[T]rue securitization is defined as a purchase of primary payment 
rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such 
payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of 
the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance 
of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so 
purchased.211 
This definition focuses on isolation at bankruptcy through a “true sale” 
because there is a legal transaction that clearly defines ownership, 
rights, and obligations.212 
In summary, Lipson’s definition requires inputs 
(loans/receivables), a structure (Special Purpose Entity (SPE) that is 
legally separated from the parent corporation), and outputs (selling of 
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securities backed by inputs).213 For example, if a bank sells a mortgage 
to a SPE, the sale must be a true sale in the eyes of the bankruptcy 
court so that if the SPE becomes bankrupt, there are no residual rights 
against the bank.214 A SPE, usually separately incorporated to 
segregate liability and obligations from the owner of loans, raises 
money by selling ownership of itself to pay the originator of the loans. 
A prominent legal scholar, Steven Schwarcz, rejected this 
formalistic framework in favor of a more flexible definition.215 
Schwarcz argues that securitization should: (1) be pragmatic; (2) 
mirror market perception of the term; and (3) be flexible enough to 
evolve with financial evolution.216 According to Schwarcz, the Lipson 
definition restricts certain structured finance models that traditionally 
have been labeled as securitization.217 Under the Lipson definition, a 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) would not be an example of 
securitization because such an obligation does not result in a true 
sale.218 CDOs are securities sold in the market like bonds; a CDO’s 
interest payments are derived from rights to pools of receivables, such 
as mortgages or student loans, but there is no direct ownership.219 
While the Lipson definition is more precise, the Schwarcz concept 
arguably is the more generally accepted definition of securitization. 
B. Government Sponsored Enterprises & Securitization 
The federal government is no stranger to securitizing its loans 
programs. From a formalistic perspective, a GSE represents one of the 
first and largest incarnations of SPEs used in securitization. While 
many claim that Lewis S. Ranieri and other bond traders at Solomon 
Brothers were the “Fathers of Securitization,”220 the concept was 
pioneered in the 1930s during the Great Depression through the 
creation of GSEs to help fund residential mortgages and increase 
                                                 
213 Lipson, supra note 6, at 1233. 
214 See id. at 1233–34. 
215 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1284. 
216 Id. at 1288–95. 
217 Id. at 1284. 
218 See id. at 1293. 
219 Id. at 1292–93. 
220 Lewis S. Ranieri: Your Mortgage Was His Bond, BUSINESS WEEK (Nov. 28, 
2004), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-11-28/lewis-s-dot-ranieri-
your-mortgage-was-his-bond. 
48 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 6 
access to homeownership.221 Ginnie Mae further developed the 
Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) market in 1970.222 A GSE is 
defined loosely but has the following general characteristics: “(1) 
private sector ownership, (2) limited competition, (3) activities limited 
by congressional charter, and (4) chartered privileges that create an 
inferred federal guarantee of obligations.”223 GSEs traditionally were 
created to provide liquidity in loan markets, which theoretically 
increases the money available to lend to individuals—be they students, 
potential home owners, or farmers.224 
By creating a “market” for these loans, lenders are able to sell 
them to investors—thus capitalizing the assets—and then relend the 
money to new lenders. In macro-economics, this process commonly is 
referred to as the money multiplier theory and is used to explain how 
the government can increase or decrease money supply.225 Where 
GSEs were instituted to provide liquidity, theoretically there should be 
an increase in lending and money supply in a particular lending 
market. 
Using the logic of liquidity and improved access to money, 
Congress formed the GSE Sallie Mae in 1972 to buy guaranteed 
student loans from lenders to recapitalize private lenders.226 
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The Congress hereby declares that it is the purpose of this section 
to establish a Government-sponsored enterprise which will be 
financed by private capital and which will serve as a secondary 
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Eventually, Sallie Mae would buy the loans, package them together, 
and sell securities based on these assets—commonly referred to as 
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities (SLABS), which are 
structurally similar to MBS. GSEs also have favorable accounting 
treatment for the federal budget because the balance sheets of GSEs, 
such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Sallie Mae—now completely 
privatized—are not included in the federal balance sheet. 227 
During the 2008 economic crisis, however, the government was 
forced to purchase loan assets from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 
report these credit risks as a liability on the balance sheet.228 This is an 
example of how GSE risk, while off the balance sheet, can still impact 
the federal government. Ginnie Mae, which is backed fully by the 
federal government, is also considered a GSE in order for the federal 
government to remove the loans and guarantees from the federal 
balance sheet.229 The impact of this accounting treatment for GSEs is 
that the government provides only a guarantee on the loans, or some 
portion thereof, similar to the FFEL program, and most of the costs 
and loan assets are not shown on the federal balance sheet. 
C. Dodd-Frank “Skin in the Game” Risk Retention Provisions 
Securitizing companies such as GSEs and banks created a negative 
feedback loop where originators did not have an incentive to ensure 
quality lending requirements.230 This is conceptually similar to the lack 
of institutional incentives to improve repayment rates of student loans. 
In the housing market, banks or lenders would originate loans and then 
sell the loan immediately to a third party through securitization. 
Because originators had a financial incentive to close the loan and to 
sell it at par value, underwriting standards became lax.231 Regulators 
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have explained this concept by stating that originators did not have any 
proverbial “skin in the game.”232 This negative feedback loop and 
other issues in the lending industry forced Congress to pass a risk 
retention provision in the Dodd-Frank Act.233 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that any securitizer of an asset-
backed security retain not less than five percent ownership of any 
security it issues.234 A securitizer is an entity that issues asset-backed 
securities or organizes and initiates such sales.235 An asset-backed 
security is a fixed income asset, or collateralized financial asset, that 
pays the holder primarily through payments from the loans it owns.236 
This risk retention requirement includes SLABS of private student 
loans and also may include SLABS of FFEL loans.237 This 
requirement has been contentious, with many scholars arguing that it 
limits the marketplace, impedes the purpose of securitization—selling 
assets, reducing risk, liquidity—and is ineffective at achieving its goal 
of aligning incentives between originators, securitizers, and 
investors.238 
Currently, academic institutions are not originators under Dodd-
Frank because they do not issue student loans or securities based on 
student loans. However, it would not be too great a conceptual leap to 
redefine academic institutions as originators under Dodd-Frank and 
subject them to the risk retention provisions. 
The retention requirement also pulls the definition of securitization 
into the forefront to determine whether student loans could be sold to 
private investors. The retention requirement creates a residual 
obligation or ownership, which could be interpreted to block the “true 
sale” requirement imposed by Lipson’s definition.239 This definition, if 
applied to student loan securitization, would make it difficult to retain 
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the Income-Base Repayment and Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
programs without the government having a residual obligation to the 
investor to cover the cost of the programs. 
D. Securitization of Student Loans 
A comparison of the markets for student loans and mortgages leads 
to an interesting policy analysis because the government has adopted 
markedly different approaches for solving problems related to 
liquidity, risk reduction, and credit enhancements. Other scholars also 
have drawn close similarities to the sub-prime mortgage market and 
the current student loan market.240 Prior to 2010, the government used 
Sallie Mae and other entities to securitize the FFEL guaranteed loans. 
Since then, however, the government has opted to lend directly to 
students and place the loans on its balance sheet using FCRA to 
estimate its value. By comparison, the government relies almost 
exclusively on GSEs and private banks to provide liquidity in the 
residential mortgage market. 241 
So, why would the government securitize the assets of mortgages 
but not student loans? Generally, there are two issues. First, a 
mortgage is backed by a secured interest in real property, while a 
student loan has no secured interest. Second, a robust private mortgage 
market exists with minimal direct government involvement, whereas 
most student loans are funded directly through the government; thus, 
there is less need to securitize student loans.242 Despite these 
limitations, the framework for securitizing student loans is already in 
place from previous FFEL programs, and it would not be difficult to 
implement. The Department has statutory authority to sell loans to 
third parties so long as it is “in the best interest of the United 
States.”243 It also has methods for measuring actual and estimated cash 
flows based on loan cohorts’ classes, schools, or programs.244 
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E. Current Market for Securitized Student Loans 
If securitization is to be used as a public policy tool to reform the 
student loan market, there must first be some proof that an established 
market exists for such investments. Private student loans, which are 
arguably more risky than federal loans, have been securitized into 
SLABS, and there has been an active market for these securities for 
years.245 The FFEL loans also were securitized through lenders such as 
Sallie Mae, and some of these loans still exist on government’s 
balance sheet even though the program was defunded in 2010. Directly 
owned federal loans also have been the target of investors who are 
eager to capitalize on the relatively high interest rates.246 
Some companies have recently sprung up to refinance federal 
student loans by seeking investors from social and economic 
standpoints. Social Finance (SoFi), for example, raises money from 
alumni to either refinance student loans from federal loans or directly 
originate new loans.247 The alumni are able to invest in students from 
their alma mater while also receiving a small return on investment.248 
The company focuses on refinancing or loaning to students that have 
higher interest federal loans—6.8% to 7.9%—by offering loans at 
5.99%, with lower fees, and matching the repayment terms of the 
Direct Loan Program.249 By November 2012, the company originated 
over $90 million in loans and had to pause its lending because demand 
exceeded funding from alumni investors.250 It even obtained $60 
million of funding from Morgan Stanley to originate more loans.251 
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Companies like SoFi and the existing SLABS market represent a 
proof-of-concept for whether there is a market for securitizing federal 
student loans.252 
Securitization also would reduce the Department’s administrative 
burden of directly managing its $1 trillion loan portfolio, which it has 
struggled to manage appropriately in the past. Just recently, the 
Department could not identify and assume control of over $1.1 billion 
of delinquent loans managed by loan servicers.253 This delayed debt 
collection activities on the defaulted loans and also prevented 
individuals from rehabilitating the delinquent debt to regular status.254 
Securitization is only feasible if the FCRA is reformed to 
encompass fair-value accounting concepts. Otherwise, securitizing 
student loans would result in large losses from selling the loans at 
market rates—as opposed to the inflated FCRA estimates currently on 
the federal balance sheet.255 By itself, the combined benefit of 
reducing risk exposure and capitalizing assets is not likely to be 
persuasive enough to change federal student loan policy. It does, 
however, provide a structural mechanism to introduce market-based 
risk pricing into postsecondary education. This feedback from neutral, 
third-party investors can provide another quality education indicator to 
participants. 
V. PROPOSALS TO REDUCE GOVERNMENT RISK 
Proposals for reducing government risks can be divided into two 
categories. The first category includes proposals that can be 
implemented immediately: (1) reforming the FCRA to more accurately 
show the riskiness of student loan debt; (2) securitizing federal student 
loan assets to reduce government risk; and (3) creating a market-based 
risk sharing mechanism to offset some or all losses from securitization 
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and provide a quality education indicator. The second category 
includes proposals that will require further study: (1) devising 
programs for risk-sharing mechanisms for loan assets; (2) devising 
securitization structures by institutional origination through Perkins 
Loans and pooling of federal assets with cost sharing provisions; and 
(3) devising pooling options for securitization. 
A. Proposals that Can Be Implemented Immediately 
1. Fair-Value Accounting & FCRA Reform 
The federal government’s accounting of student loans is flawed 
and should be changed to reflect fair-value accounting principles, 
which would take into account contingent losses that are known and 
reasonably estimated and the gains or losses caused solely by 
adjustment of federal interest rates.256 The recent change tying new 
loans to 10-Year Treasury Notes does not fully mitigate FCRA cost 
estimate losses because of caps on the rates,257 and it does not address 
the inaccurate estimates of existing loans. A change to fair-value 
accounting will cost the government by limiting the existing ‘negative 
subsidy’ of federal loans and by more accurately writing down losses 
based on the income-based repayment and public service loan 
forgiveness programs;258 however, this accounting reform likely will 
be required regardless of whether federal officials attempt additional 
student loan reforms. Currently, the government receives roughly $35 
billion in negative subsidies annually,259 and this undoubtedly will be 
reduced when the government begins to estimate the value of the loans 
more accurately. 
If the Department is forced to account more accurately for its 
student loan assets, losses from securitization will be reduced. In its 
current form, any securitization will result in automatic losses to the 
federal government because the loan assets are inflated artificially 
through FCRA accounting. Without full guarantees of principal and 
interest payments similar to the FFEL program, private investors will 
demand lower prices for the assets than the valuation carried on the 
Department’s balance sheet because of known risk exposure 
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unrecognized through the current FCRA calculation. Thus, before any 
sort of substantial student loan reform can occur, such as securitization 
or risk sharing, a change to fair-value accounting is needed. 
2. Securitization of Loans to Reduce Risk 
Assuming accounting reform is successful, the federal government 
should securitize some of its student loan assets by selling them to 
third-party investors in order to reduce its future risk exposure—even 
if it is fairly valued at the time of sale. There are a number of methods 
the Department or the Treasury could take to monetize these assets. 
These structures depend on the different definitions of securitization, 
as discussed in Part IV. Generally, the federal government could 
securitize its student loan assets in the following ways: (1) transfer 
assets to a GSE similar to Ginnie Mae and issue SLABS with some 
form of federal guarantees for principal and interest; (2) directly issue 
SLABS just like Sallie Mae does for private loans; or (3) sell a 
collateralized debt obligation with risk exposure to the student loan 
assets but with no direct ownership. 
The creation of a special purpose entity in the form of a GSE is a 
proven approach to minimizing federal risk exposure to loan assets but 
would not provide any reform in higher education. Because the federal 
government fully owns all direct loans, it has the power to sell them to 
a GSE.260 Sallie Mae did this until it became privatized in the late 
1990s.261 Structurally, this would be similar to Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac, whereby the GSE provides guarantees for some principal and 
interest. It would not have the explicit backing of the federal 
government unless it was structured similar to Ginnie Mae, which has 
explicit government guarantees.262 The funding mechanism effectively 
would deleverage the federal government, but it would not introduce 
risk-pricing into the higher education market.263 
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A similar proposal was made by investment bankers in 2011, 
although it did not use a GSE structure.264 Under this proposal, the 
government would have issued $555 billion in federal debt that would 
have been bought by private investors to refinance federal direct loan 
assets. The student loans would have been removed from the balance 
sheet and reclassified as some other form of debt.265 As a result, the 
newly issued debt would have been 100% guaranteed by the federal 
government.266 While this would not reduce the government’s risk 
exposure, it would allow investment bankers to generate large fees for 
underwriting the new securities.267 
From a public policy perspective, it is imperative that the federal 
government retain some level of control over repayment programs. In 
the case of a true sale of the loan assets, the government would have 
to: (1) issue some sort of guarantee to cover the risk of public loan 
forgiveness, and (2) subsidize loans that have income-based repayment 
plans. These repayment programs reflect Congress’ recognition that 
providing a better safety net and payment flexibility is sound social 
policy.268 However, under a securitization scheme, these programs 
increase the complexity of the structured finance products, which 
already are complicated by repayment risk and other factors.269 
Some form of a CDO likely provides the most flexible method of 
securitizing student loans assets. Structurally, the Department would 
issue SLABS bonds that would be tied to student loan revenue 
streams. The holders of these bonds would not directly own the loan 
assets; instead the bondholders would own the rights to all or some of 
the revenue streams as payments are made by students. Thus, by 
retaining ownership of the loans, the Department would be able to 
continue its assistance programs to students while at the same time 
reducing risk exposure from the asset sales. If a person qualifies for 
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debt forgiveness or cancellation, this would operate similar to an early 
repayment event, which would be funded by the Department from that 
year’s budget.270 Additionally, using this CDO approach, the 
government could either sell the assets as one risk profile—every 
investor receives the same risk and portion of payment—or through 
tranches—investors choose their priority to receive payments in return 
for higher or lower yields on the amount invested.271 The debt 
obligation could be managed by the Department, the Federal Treasury, 
or a Special Purpose Vehicle within the government.272 Through the 
FFEL program and the emergency ECASLA program, the Department 
has an expertise in handling similarly complex loan transactions.273 
Additionally, the Department supervises loan servicers for all direct 
loans.274 The federal government has the expertise to securitize these 
assets, especially if incentives are given to investment bankers to assist 
the process through underwriting fees.275 
Securitization, as a way to reduce risk to the government, arguably 
does not form a strong enough reason for restructuring federal student 
loan programs. Due to market risks, like those that lead to the 2008 
crisis, securitization may not actually reduce risk exposure. Also, in 
order to entice private investors, the government must sell the assets at 
or below market value.276 Without FCRA reform, this undoubtedly 
will be lower than the current value on the Department’s balance 
sheet.277 What securitization does accomplish, however, is to open 
student loan assets to financial evaluation by third parties. If there is 
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market exposure to the loan assets, and not just 100% guarantees on 
the securitized debt, then investors will assign market-based prices 
based on the repayment risk. This risk pricing mechanism creates a 
great opportunity to form another quality education indicator for 
higher education institutions. 
3. Market-Based Risk Sharing Mechanisms as Quality 
Education Indicators 
If the first two proposals are feasible, there is an opportunity to 
combine the concept of Cost Sharing with States from the 1990s with 
the general premise of the Put-Option proposal to create a market-
based quality education indicator.278 Instead of the states bearing the 
burden for defaulting loans, this proposal would force academic 
institutions to retain at least some of the credit risk of their students’ 
loans through risk retention. Once the loans are securitized, the 
institutions would bear some portion of the risk. This would force 
schools to incorporate such risks into their cost-benefit analyses. If a 
school cannot bear the cost or risk, then the school will reduce risky 
programs or shutdown. 
Successful institutions will either internalize the additional costs, if 
any, or pass the increased cost onto students with higher tuition. This, 
much like the Risk-Based Pricing proposal by Simkovic,279 would 
provide a quality education indicator to students for certain programs 
or institutions without directly regulating loan interest rates. 
Institutions would have the flexibility to determine whether to pass the 
cost onto students. For example, a for-profit institution may choose to 
bear the cost of government securitization to keep tuition low for 
better long-term repayment rates. A large public university may 
choose just to pass the cost onto the students. 
This incentive structure could provide quality education indicators 
to help institutions close the feedback loop on whether an education 
program provides sufficient outcomes. Institutions could make 
programs with risky learning outcomes—architecture, arts, English, 
law—more selective to allow only the best students to enroll. This 
would limit an institution’s exposure to defaulting student loans and 
would presumably create better student outcomes. Additionally, 
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institutions would be forced to make explicit cost-benefit analyses as 
to whether a program provides sufficient employment outcomes to 
justify the risk exposure of the student debt. It is possible that the 
increased cost from risk sharing could be folded into future tuition 
increases.280 Thus, future students would pay a higher cost of 
education because of bad outcomes of past students. This increased 
tuition cost could dissuade prospective students from attending the 
institution in favor of cheaper options where the risk sharing costs of 
loan repayments are decreased. 
Implementation of this proposal would also force institutions to 
take a more proactive role in providing academic advising and career 
counseling. By giving accurate and realistic advice on choosing a 
major and a career, a school would be able to reduce its risk by 
promoting career paths that tend to be successful. Some institutions 
have started to apply this concept. The approach, however, has been 
piecemeal, and the incentive structure is lacking.281 The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau already has a program called “Know 
Before You Owe,” but it is not integrated with financial aid or 
academic advising at institutions.282 
Most importantly, through implementation of this proposal, 
accrediting agencies will receive direct feedback from the market as to 
whether institutions provide educations of sufficient quality. For 
example, if one offering of securitized student loans imposes a larger 
cost than that of similar offerings, the accreditors will receive a clear 
indication that there is something potentially wrong with the quality of 
education at the institution offering the loans. The high cost of such an 
offering also would indicate to the federal government that there is a 
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need to encourage accrediting agencies to review the policies of the 
aforementioned institutions; this market-based indicator would 
compensate for the statutory prohibition against the government itself 
making judgments about the quality of education.283 Conceptually, this 
is similar to bond and credit ratings for universities that are monitored 
by accreditors.284 
Additionally, institutions must prove their administrative capacity 
and financial responsibility, of which credit ratings and audits are a 
component, to be eligible to receive Title IV funds.285 Instead of 
placing the risk on the student by using risk-based pricing as proposed 
by Simkovic,286 this proposal does not penalize young students that 
have asymmetrical information in the postsecondary education market. 
B. Proposals that Require Further Study 
This section will outline the different policy options for risk 
retention, securitization structures, and pooling methods. 
Combinations of these structures will require further study by 
economists, politicians, and regulators to determine which would be 
the easiest to implement. While any of these methods are feasible, it 
would be premature to eliminate one method over the other without 
additional research. Because they only outline the process for 
securitization, these securitization mechanics do not detrimentally 
impact the underlying policy goals of reducing government risk and 
providing a quality educational feedback indicator to institutions. 
1. Risk-Sharing Losses & Risk Retention of Loan Assets 
There are two potential methods to create a risk retention 
mechanism with securitized student loans. First, the federal 
government could utilize a risk-sharing device similar to previously 
proposed and repealed cost sharing structures for defaulting loans 
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enacted in the 1990s.287 When the securities are sold on the open 
market, institutions would be fully or partially responsible for covering 
any losses to the federal government. For instance, if the security was 
at a $1000 par value, riskier student loans would sell at $950 to 
increase the yield to compensate for the risk. This would result in a 
loss of $50 to the federal government. Based on each school’s 
proportional representation of the student loans in the security, each 
school would be forced to contribute funds to compensate the federal 
government for this loss. Like the previous risk sharing proposal in the 
1990s, the institutions could be forced to cover only a portion of the 
loss.288 There also could be mitigating factors such as local 
unemployment rates, an institution’s status as a historically black 
college, or income levels for the local area.289 
Second, the federal government could interpret institutions as 
being “originators” of the asset-backed-securities created from the 
securitized student loans to trigger the risk retention requirements of 
Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank requires originators of securitized assets to 
retain a five percent ownership of those assets.290 For example, for a 
$1,000 security, comprised of ten $100 loans from one institution, the 
institution would be forced to own exposure to $50 of debt. As an 
owner of the asset, the institution would receive a portion of loan 
repayments like any other investor. Alternatively, it could either buy 
the ownership from the Department at par value, $50, or buy an option 
from a third party to cover the five percent interest of the securitized 
asset in case of default. Assuming the option expense is similar to the 
cost of the federal government guaranteeing an FFEL loan, it would 
cost the institution roughly 15% of the loan’s value. In this example, 
the cost would be around $7.50 (15% x $50) to buy an option to 
guarantee the institution’s $50 portion of the security.291 Both of these 
proposals would achieve the goal of creating market-based risk 
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indicators for institutions. This risk exposure would help reduce any 
losses from securitization and also provide a valuable quality of 
education indicator to students, regulators, and accreditors. 
2. Securitization Structures: Institutional Origination through 
Perkins Loans & Pooling of Federal Assets with Cost 
Sharing Provisions 
There are two potential securitization structures for student loans, 
both of which offer different incentives and complexities. First, the 
Department could switch all of its student loan funding to Perkins 
Loans, which are directly originated by the institutions. The 
Department has recently sought to revitalize this program by making it 
a mandatory credit program.292 Because the institutions originate the 
loans, they already would bear the risk of repayment. This also would 
provide a method to create a pilot program without overhauling most 
financial aid programs. To provide liquidity, the Department could 
purchase the loans through a program similar to ECASLA but pass any 
losses from securitization back to the institutions. It would then pool 
similar loans—either by school, major, or accreditation, as discussed 
below—and sell them on the private market. Any losses on the public 
sale would be shared with the schools.293 The federal government 
could partially subsidize the loans by guaranteeing the loans at some 
minimum level.294 
Second, the Department can pool its directly owned loans for 
securitization and require institutions to bear some or all of the risk 
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from securitization. This could be implemented by requiring 
institutions to agree to this cost sharing provision as a requirement for 
access to Title IV funds.295 In this structure, the government would 
pass the losses from securitization back to institutions. Using the 
example of the $1000 security comprised of 10 loans, if the security 
was sold for $990, then there would be a loss to the government of 
$10.296 That loss would be distributed back to each loan 
proportionally; in this example, that would translate to a cost of $1 per 
loan. Requiring academic institutions to compensate the federal 
government for losses could be enforced through the already-existing 
Program Participation Agreement required for each institution.297 
3. Pooling Options for Securitization 
In order to properly align incentives to academic institutions, the 
securitized loans need to be pooled in such a way as to provide clear 
quality education indicators. If the Department pooled all the loans 
together, there would be no way to distinguish quality programs and 
academic institutions from poor ones. In order to create quality 
indicators, the Department could pool loans by academic institution, 
programmatic accreditation, or institutional accreditation. 
Pooling loans by institutions would be the most effective means of 
providing indicators through risk-based prices. This would be similar 
to bond prices for university debt, and it would provide very clear 
indicators for educational quality. Some universities, however, will not 
graduate enough students per year to form a marketable security. For 
example, the small liberal arts school of Centre College in Danville, 
Kentucky, graduates roughly 350 students per year, and each graduate 
has a total of roughly $22,000 in student loan debt.298 This would yield 
around $7.7 million in assets to securitize annually, which is much too 
small to be marketable to investors. While this method is ideal for 
creating quality education indicators, securitization under this method 
would be impracticable. 
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Pooling loans by programmatic accreditation would isolate the 
riskiness and quality of each academic program. This form of 
securitization would encourage each academic program to change its 
policies to achieve better loan repayment outcomes. The problem with 
this approach, which is similar to Simkovic’s risk-based pricing,299 is 
that it would unfairly penalize academic programs that do not 
traditionally have high employment or salary rates—regardless of 
quality. This type of risk segregation is likely to be too precise. For 
example, medical school programs approved through the American 
Medical Association would lead to higher priced securities because 
there is less risk. Likewise, teaching programs accredited by the 
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education would yield 
lower prices because the average salary would be less and because 
employment rates are lower. This would limit an institution’s ability to 
reform its programs so it would choose to either cut or expand 
programs based on perceived risk of particular professions and not 
based on the quality of the institution’s programs. 
Pooling loans through institutional accreditation would provide the 
largest group of loans for securitization and also would force 
institutional reforms through accreditors. There are two types of 
institutional accreditation, national and regional accreditation.300 
National accreditors mainly accredit career and vocational institutions 
or religiously-focused institutions, while regional accreditors accredit 
the more traditional universities.301 The federal government may have 
difficulty securitizing an accreditor such as the Transnational 
Association of Christian Colleges and Schools because it is comprised 
of only 55 schools with a combined enrollment of 17,000 students.302 
However, most national and regional accreditors would be large 
enough to form sustainable pools of loans for securitization. 
To securitize by institutional accreditation, the Department would 
combine all loans from institutions from the same institutional 
accreditor and sell them on the open market as a security. Any loss 
would be distributed back to institutions in proportion to the student 
loan debt that institution contributed to the security. This would 
encourage institutions to forum shop for accreditation from accreditors 
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that are perceived as less risky. For example, the University of 
Chicago may be less inclined to be accredited by The Higher Learning 
Commission who also accredits online universities such as the 
University of Phoenix.303 This would provide indirect incentives to 
accreditors to improve their standards to achieve better repayment 
outcomes for accredited institutions. A clear example of policy reform 
would be accreditors requiring academic institutions to provide 
academic counseling and career services to reduce the risk of bad 
repayment outcomes. 
All of these models could utilize credit tranches to make the loans 
more marketable to risk-adverse investors. As part of this risk 
retention policy, the Department could require the academic 
institutions to own the riskiest tranches of the security. This would 
allow institutions to bear the burden of reforming its policies and 
programs to reduce its own costs. It also would make the securitized 
loans more viable investments. 
Considering the history of student loans, it would be prudent to 
start this process through a pilot or demonstration program. This could 
mirror the implementation of the Direct Loan Program in 1992, which 
eventually became the exclusive federal student loan program in 2010. 
The Department could use securitization as a method to gain liquidity 
with the Direct Loan Program while also testing the viability of 
market-based risk pricing mechanisms on a small scale. If successful, 
the Department would have estimates of how much cost to pass onto 
institutions for broader programs of securitization. 
Another incentive structure for institutions to participate in the 
pilot program would be for the Department to provide a conduit for 
institutions to sell institution-owned Perkins Loans similar to the 
ECASLA program. Institutions would be able to sell the Perkins Loans 
to the Department on the condition that the institutions agree to share 
some or all of the losses incurred through securitization of the loans. 
Again, this would allow the Department to test the viability of selling 
securitized loans on the private market on a small scale while also 
determining the appropriate method of risk-sharing with institutions. 
More interdisciplinary research is needed to test the viability of these 
securitization concepts and potential pilot programs. The proposals 
here are meant to encourage additional research to determine the best 
                                                 
303 Directory of HLC Accredited Institutions, THE HIGHER LEARNING COMMISSION 
– NORTH CENTRAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ncahlc.org/Directory-of-HLC-
Institutions.html (last visited May 20, 2013). 
66 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 6 
approach to reduce government risk and provide quality education 
indicators. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Federal financial aid is currently at risk of faltering because of 
unrecognized accounting risks in the budget and balance sheet. This 
inevitably will lead to some accounting reform, either through FCRA 
reform or through agency changes in repayment and discount rate 
estimates. History has shown that student loan reform primarily occurs 
because of favorable treatment in the federal budget and balance sheet, 
not because of bad student outcomes.304 Given this assumption, the 
Department has an opportunity to introduce some form of loan 
securitization to reduce risk exposure, capitalize loan assets to reduce 
the budget costs, and introduce a new quality of education indicator to 
postsecondary education by using market-based risk. 
The recent Student Loan Certainty Act has laid the foundation for 
the federal government to use market-based pricing with student loans 
to reduce federal budget and balance sheet risks. The legislation also 
demonstrates Congressional support for policies with short-term 
upfront costs in exchange for long-term risk reduction to the federal 
government. Academic institutions are the parties most capable of 
bearing the market-risk from student loan repayment rates because 
students have asymmetrical information and the federal government 
cannot regulate the quality of education. Furthermore, academic 
institutions and accrediting agencies are best able to respond 
effectively to securitization incentives through academic advising, 
choice of programs, and curriculum. While not a panacea, 
securitization provides a policy mechanism to reform our current 
student loan programs and create a new quality education indicator. 
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